

---

MEMOIR  
OF THE  
OPERATIONS  
OF  
*THE ARMY OF THE DANUBE.*

---



h  
ons

MEMORIAL

MEMORIAL

OF THE

CHURCH OF ENGLAND

THE BAPTIST OF THE DAVEN

58d  
1  
M E M O I R

OF THE

OPERATIONS

OF

THE ARMY OF THE DANUBE,

UNDER THE COMMAND OF

GENERAL JOURDAN, *K*

1799.

TAKEN FROM THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THAT OFFICER.

---

---

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

---

---

LONDON:

PRINTED BY BUNNEY AND GOLD, SHOE-LANE,  
FOR J. DEBRETT, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

---

1799.

25

MEMOIR

OPERATIONS

THE ARMY OF THE DANUBE



PRINTED BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF GREAT BRITAIN

LONDON

1854

BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF GREAT BRITAIN



PARIS, 10th Vendemaire, (1st October,) 8th Year  
of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

The Representative of the People JOURDAN  
(de la Haute Vienne) to Citizen CHARLES,  
Printer, rue Nicaise, No. 513.

*YOU have assured me, Citizen, that you would  
print with pleasure the Memoir of the Operations  
of the Army of the Danube, which I propose to  
publish : I accordingly send you the Manuscript,*

*If I were rich enough, I would circulate the  
Memoir gratis : but, as my circumstances do not ad-  
mit of such an expence, I authorise you to sell it in any  
way you shall think best ; and I assure you that  
I do not mean to derive from it any pecuniary ad-  
vantage whatever.*

*Health and fraternity,*

JOURDAN.

IN consequence of the assignment which has been made me by Citizen Jourdan, author of the *Memoir of the Operations of the Army of the Danube*, I declare this work to be my property. I place it under the safe-guard of the laws, the integrity of my fellow-citizens: and I will prosecute in the tribunals any one who shall pirate the work, or distribute pirated editions of it.

CHARLES.

JOURDAN

## PREFACE.

**P**ERSECUTED by injustice, exposed to the most atrocious calumnies, attacked in his honour—which is so dear to a man who has any sentiment of dignity, and to a republican; I yield, with extreme reluctance, to the wishes of my friends.—I have at length resolved on the painful task of giving a faithful account, and throwing a new light on my military operations.—How could I believe it possible that I should ever be suspected? But in a time of ge-



neral corruption—daring villainy is too successful in its wish to blast and poison every thing around it. A people who have been so long betrayed scarce feel any other sentiment than that of suspicion. They have seen so much perfidy, and been surrounded with such various enemies, that they no longer believe they have any faithful defenders. In the midst of such a confusion of opinions, the virtuous man would experience real discouragement, if he were not supported by the testimony of his conscience, and the hope of making truth triumphant. — If I stood alone, I should brave the utmost efforts of calumny: but my silence would be a crime, if it should deprive the brave troops who fought under my command, and those officers who have distinguished themselves both by their ta-

lents and their courage, of the justice due to them. Motives less powerful than these would not have induced me to violate the law I had imposed on myself, to delay the publication of my Memoirs till the return of peace.

This small part of them, which the misfortunes of the time wring from me, will give a triumphant answer to the false assertions of the Ex-director Reubell; who, in order to palliate the vices of a monstrous administration, had the audacity to declare, from the tribune of the Council of Elders,—“ We have entrusted great military power, more extensive than the Republic ever possessed in former times ; nor can it have been otherwise, since the very wreck of them has so imposing an

" aspect.—These means have been confided  
 " to some men, who have been successful  
 " till now, and whom fortune has aban-  
 " doned; and to others whose glory has  
 " been tarnished by misfortunes, but not  
 " effaced:—we may still hope that glory  
 " will reattach itself to their car."

This Memoir will, I hope, impose silence  
 on those base spirits who accuse, for the  
 sake of accusing, as well as those violent  
 and wicked men, who would bear down  
 integrity and virtue, by the weight of that  
 hatred and abhorrence which they alone  
 deserve. It will annihilate the reports which  
 have been circulated concerning me,—that  
 I almost entirely destroyed the army; that  
 I placed the conscripts in the advanced  
 posts, and ordered them to be shot. A re-



volting absurdity,—that the most atrocious malice could alone imagine. The candid reader will be easily convinced, that I have done much more than could be reasonably expected from the feeble power entrusted to me ; and that I never ceased to demand a force proportioned to the enemy. He will also perceive, that the disasters of our armies are the sole work of the Directors, who ordered the Generals to fight, without affording them the means to insure victory.

h  
ons

working steadily, that the most arduous  
labours could alone imagine. The candid  
reader will be easily convinced, that I have  
done much more than could be reasonably  
expected from the feeble power allotted  
to me; and that I never ceased to demand  
a force proportioned to the enemy. He  
will also perceive, that the diffusion of our  
armies into the whole of the Direction,  
the refusal of the Generals to fight without  
being first enabled to obtain victory.

Russia, who, to this moment, had contented

himself with giving protection to the French

emigrants, published to all the world its design

to take a very active part in the war. The

King of Naples refused to acknowledge the

Roman Republic, and, in contempt of the new

Polish treaties, received a detachment of British

ships in its harbours. Lastly, from the month

of

the Republic every thing prefigured a new con-

dition, more favourable than the former

one; since it threatened us at a time when a

**T**HE Negotiations at Rastadt were now protracted to a great length, and did not promise a successful termination.—England agitated all the Cabinets of Europe, and Austria employed an extraordinary degree of activity in recruiting its armies. It had collected an immense magazine of arms and warlike stores of every kind; and all its military energies were in a state of preparation. It must have been under the influence of a very extraordinary delusion, that an expectation of peace could have been indulged when such hostile dispositions presented themselves on all sides.



Russia, who, to this moment, had contented herself with giving protection to the French emigrants, published to all the world its design to take a very active part in the war. The King of Naples refused to acknowledge the Roman Republic, and, in contempt of the most solemn treaties, received a squadron of British ships in its harbours.—Lastly, from the month of Fructidor (September), in the sixth year of the Republic, every thing presaged a new coalition, more terrible, perhaps, than the former one; since it threatened us at a time when a part of our resources were exhausted; when the genius of faction, the influence of royalists, the prolonged oppressions of the patriots, and a plan of reaction, countenanced by the Machiavelian calculations of those who governed, had almost annihilated enthusiasm, public spirit, and the love of liberty. Besides, we had not our independence alone to defend,—we had allies to protect and to sustain; Allies,—whom we could not abandon without betraying the most sacred duties.

It was from the aspect of these dangers, whose extent could not be concealed, that a Director requested me to communicate to him my ideas on the military operations which it would be necessary to undertake in case of a war.

My patriotism was influenced by very powerful reasons to prevent my being in haste to satisfy his desire.—I, however, delivered a memorial to the Director, in which, after taking a rapid view of our situation relative to the other powers of Europe; and having made it appear that it was absolutely necessary to prepare for war, I unfolded the plan of military operations; an account of which I shall proceed to communicate.

“The House of Austria,” I said, in this Memoir, “must have given up every hope of reconquering Belgium, more especially since the cession of Mentz; but it certainly entertains the design of aggrandizing itself in Italy, of destroying the republics which have been cre-

“ ated there, of protecting the Kings of Sardinia  
 “ and Naples, and the Duke of Tuscany; in short,  
 “ of re-establishing the ancient order of things in  
 “ that country. There can be little doubt but it  
 “ proposes to restore the ancient form of govern-  
 “ ment in the Swiss Cantons; and, perhaps, to  
 “ appropriate to itself a part of them, under the  
 “ pretext of protecting the whole. There is every  
 “ reason, therefore, to presume that the princi-  
 “ pal strength of this power will be directed to  
 “ Italy and the frontiers of Switzerland; and  
 “ that it will but feebly defend that part of the  
 “ empire which is situated on the left bank of  
 “ the Danube.—It is equally to be expected,  
 “ that the King of Naples, the Duke of Tus-  
 “ cany, and the King of Sardinia, will support  
 “ the interests of the House of Austria, and that  
 “ they will openly declare in its favour, as soon  
 “ as circumstances will permit the adoption of  
 “ such a measure.”

Having made these preliminary reflections,  
 which subsequent events have so fully justified, I  
 proceeded as follows:—



" The whole of the French troops should be  
 " divided into Six Armies. One of sixty thou-  
 " sand men will be employed to conquer the  
 " kingdom of Naples, Tuscany, and Piedmont,  
 " and to convert their governments into repub-  
 " lics. This force shall also be employed to  
 " maintain good order and tranquillity in the  
 " interior of Italy.

" A Second Army, of forty thousand men,  
 " shall be employed to protect Holland, to keep  
 " our towns on the Rhine, and to lay siege to  
 " Ehrenbreitstein, Mannheim, and Philippsbourg.  
 " This force will protect the communications  
 " and the convoy of the army acting in Ger-  
 " many.

" An army consisting of eighty thousand men,  
 " called the Army of the Danube, shall stretch  
 " by the shortest line from the Rhine to the Da-  
 " nube.—It shall be protected on the left by the  
 " latter river, and on its right by the mountains  
 " of the Tirol. It shall be appointed to extend,  
 " by a chain of posts as far as the Ens.

“ A Fourth Army, of forty thousand, men shall  
 “ proceed from Switzerland to penetrate into  
 “ the Tirol: and shall be destined to follow the  
 “ movements of the Armies of the Danube  
 “ and of Italy.

“ The Army of Italy, consisting of forty  
 “ thousand men, shall attack the enemy in the  
 “ states of Venice, and shall take the direction  
 “ of Clagenfurt.

“ The three last Armies being united on the  
 “ Ens, subject to one Commander in Chief, and  
 “ in possession of all the roads which lead to  
 “ Vienna, shall stretch on to the capital of  
 “ Austria; where a decisive battle will, with-  
 “ out doubt, determine the fortune of that  
 “ state.

“ A Sixth body, of twenty thousand men, shall  
 “ remain in Switzerland.

“ Such is the basis, I added, of a plan for the  
 “ campaign; every part of which is susceptible

"of an enlarged system of detail, respecting the  
 "means of carrying it into execution. And I  
 "made an offer of my services to illustrate it.

#### Recapitulation of the Troops.

|                                    |             |
|------------------------------------|-------------|
| Army of Naples . . . . .           | 60,000 men. |
| Army of Italy . . . . .            | 80,000      |
| Army of the Tirol . . . . .        | 40,000      |
| Army of the Danube . . . . .       | 80,000      |
| Army of Observation on the Rhine   | 40,000      |
| Army of Observation in Switzerland | 20,000      |
| <hr/>                              |             |
| Total . . . . .                    | 320,000     |

It appears, according to the operations which have since taken place, that the Directory adopted that basis of the plan of the campaign which I had proposed, but that it neglected the means of ensuring success, by falling very short in the number of troops which I had determined to be necessary for each Army. Experience has since proved that I had not overcharged the number which the situation of things required: nor did I make a demand which it was not very possible to accomplish, since the legislative body



had decreed the funds for upwards of four hundred thousand men ; while the military conscription would be sufficient to compleat the defective corps and even to form new ones. Real patriotic intentions, and the simple exercise of common sense, would have produced the most beneficial effects. The Republic would have been exalted, its most brilliant periods would have been renewed ; and it had only to avail itself of the resources which the legislative body had put into its hands, to obtain the most important advantages. It could raise armies far more numerous than those of its enemies, and would thereby have spared the effusion of human blood ; because, as battles would have been more decisive, they must have been less frequent. Brilliant victories would then have re-animated the courage of our warriors ; and their enthusiasm would not have been chilled by remaining in a long and painful state of defence. The Directory would then have economised the finances of the Republic ; it would have saved the inhabitants of our frontiers, by enabling the Generals to make the enemy's country the theatre of hostilities, and to

derive from it the maintenance of the troops. To have carried on such operations it did not require the efforts of extraordinary genius: by a wise execution of the law that enforced conscription, and in checking the disastrous waste of public money, the Directory would have soon compelled the belligerent powers to demand peace]

There is a great *hiatus* to fill up in our laws; or, to speak with greater precision, it is imperiously necessary that a vigilant attention should be given to their execution. The legislative body, alarmed at those revolting abuses which they daily behold, will, doubtless, occupy themselves in forming means to obtain clear accounts of the funds which they grant for the different branches of the public service; while the word *responsibility*, which has hitherto possessed a vague uncertain meaning, will at length acquire a determined signification. Then will that immoral system cease, which has transformed so many public men into private enemies; who, shielded by the impunity attached to their situation, have created, in the very bosom of our disasters,

dishonourable fortunes ; which has deprived the people of all confidence ; and taught them to consider the greater part of the civil officers, as rapacious plunderers : a system wofully discouraging to virtue, because in filling every mind with suspicion, it deprives the honest man of the most delightful of his enjoyments, the esteem of his fellow citizens. In patient expectation of the tardy hour of justice, this memoir will prove, whether from treason or idiotism, I shall not pretend to determine, that our Armies on the Rhine, have been entirely neglected ; and that this criminal negligence occasioned the successes of our enemies, on whom the French name, hitherto, had impressed a sentiment of terror.

The Executive Directory appeared to be satisfied with the observations that I had communicated to them, and offered me the command of an army. The recommencement of hostilities was no longer a matter of doubt in my mind ; and whatever charm there might be for a republican enjoying the august title of a representative of the



people, and the honour of participating in the most important deliberations; thinking, as I did, that I should be more useful in the field than in the senate, I did not balance a moment, but quitted the chair of the Council of Five Hundred, where I at that time presided, to take the command of the Army of Mentz.

I had the pleasure to receive the most flattering testimonies of affection from my colleagues. A reception, the remembrance of which my heart still cherishes, awaited me at the place of my destination. I was received with transport by those brave men, to whose minds my presence recalled the scenes of their glory;—by those brave men whom I had conducted in the same campaign, from the banks of the Sambre to those of the Rhine; and with whom, during the following campaign, I forced a barrier, which till then had been deemed impregnable.

My first care was to inform myself of the situation of the army of which I took the command: and it appeared from the information of General

Ferino, who was temporary Commander in Chief, that it was composed of thirty-two thousand and eighty-four infantry; of ten thousand seven hundred and eighty-six cavalry, and four thousand four hundred and thirty-four artillery, comprehending the garrisons of all the places, from Duffeldorf to Huninguen: the whole forming an Army of forty-seven thousand three hundred and four men.

The greater part of these troops were dispersed on the right bank of the Rhine, in the duchy of Bergues, in Westphalia, and Veteravia, as far as the Nidda. The inhabitants of these countries furnished sustenance for the soldiers, and forage for the horses of the cavalry and artillery. The districts on the right bank of the Rhine, in the vicinity of Ehrenbreitstein, provided for the subsistence of the different corps employed in the blockade of that fortress. The towns, however, were without any regular supply of provisions; the Army was not possessed of magazines; while the contractors demanded payment of what was due to them, and refused to furnish another article of

any kind. Of six thousand horses which had been promised to remount the cavalry; and which, according to the conditions of their purchase, ought to have been delivered on the first of Frimaire, (21 Nov.) there arrived but eight hundred. Every other branch of the service was in the same wretched state. The pay of the troops was alone efficient, and was obtained from the funds that were produced by the contributions, levied on the countries conquered by France, but not yet united to it.

I was compelled to employ my utmost exertions, to controul this alarming state of affairs. I did not delay to instruct the Directory and the War Minister, by a very circumstantial report on the situation of the Army of Mentz. I addressed a second, on the sixth Frimaire (26 Nov.), on the subject of furnishing with provisions the garrison of Mentz. At length, on the eleventh Frimaire (1 Dec.), I completed my picture of the situation of the Army, by a third report, relative to the supply of all the places, within the circuit of the Army which I commanded.—I here



annex the letter which accompanied the last report.

“ I have the honour to send you, herewith,  
 “ a statement of the actual situation of the pro-  
 “ vision magazines in the different places com-  
 “ prised in the circuit of the Army which I  
 “ command. You will be convinced, on read-  
 “ ing it, that it is impossible to provide for their  
 “ defence, if the most speedy and efficacious mea-  
 “ sures are not adopted, to compel the contrac-  
 “ tors to fulfill their engagements, and to dis-  
 “ tribute to those places, on which the defence of  
 “ the frontiers absolutely depends, the provisions  
 “ necessary to complete their magazines.

“ I have already transmitted to you an account  
 “ of the situation of the Army, and of the Garri-  
 “ son of Mentz ; and I have submitted to you the  
 “ means, which I think the most proper to ac-  
 “ celerate the supply of provisions. I solicit you,  
 “ therefore, to take my demand into considera-  
 “ tion, and to give the particular orders to the  
 “ contractors to use the utmost expedition in

“ providing the different places with the necessities of which they stand in need.”

The means I proposed were prompt, certain, and of easy accomplishment. They tended to the comfort of the united countries, and offered considerable advantages to the Republic. These departments abound in grain ; but as they possess no opening for the sale of it, specie of any kind is very rare, and consequently the collection of contributions proportionally difficult. The administrators of the departments la Roer and Mont-Tonnere proposed to supply certain places with grain, at the current price, as a deduction of the contributions in arrear. This expedient, so simple, as well as so conformable to the interests of the people, was rejected : and the reason is evident, the burdensome and oppressive mode of contracts was preferred, because certain persons were to be gainers by them. It is not the first time that the fate of the brave defenders of their country has been made subordinate to base and sordid considerations. Thus it was that the Army remained without magazines, and the garrisons without provisions.

Nevertheless, an insurrection having manifested itself in the countries formerly known as Belgium and Luxembourg, I was obliged to detach five battalions from my feeble Army, four regiments of cavalry, and a company of light artillery, to check the progress of this seditious spirit. At the very same moment, the Minister gave orders that a demi-brigade of the Army of Mentz should march immediately into Switzerland. The letter which he wrote to me on the occasion proves, at the same time, that he was convinced how much I stood in need of reinforcements. It is of sufficient importance to find a place in these memoirs.

“ PARIS, 4th Frimaire, the 7th year of the  
*Republic, one and indivisible.*

“ The Minister of War to General Jourdan,  
 Commander in Chief of the Army of Mentz.

“ The large body of Austrian forces which  
 “ have been collected in the Grisons and the  
 “ Tirol, as well as the position of the Army of  
 “ Italy, oblige me to strengthen the right of the  
 “ Army of Helvetia, and to order it to detach a



“ a corps of four thousand men into the Canton  
 “ of Ballinzone, beyond Saint Gothard, to cover  
 “ the left of the Army of Italy.

“ This movement was of a very urgent nature,  
 “ and as the Army of Helvetia would find itself  
 “ too weak, for the moment, I have given orders  
 “ directly to General Ghâteauneufe-Randon, to  
 “ detach immediately a demi-brigade of the fifth  
 “ military division to Basse ; where it will be at  
 “ the disposition of General Shawembourg.

“ I therefore solicit you to give such orders as  
 “ you shall think proper for its being replaced in  
 “ the position which it shall have quitted ; if,  
 “ however, it should be necessary to replace it.

“ I am sensible, my dear General, that the  
 “ actual weakness of the Army of Mentz, may be  
 “ the cause of your regarding with uneasiness the  
 “ departure of a demi-brigade for Switzerland ;  
 “ but I assure you that it shall be immediately  
 “ replaced : and besides, the formation of a body  
 “ of Swiss troops, which General Schawembourg

" is ordered to accelerate, and of which fan-  
 " guine hopes are entertained, will be employed  
 " to reinforce you with several demi-brigades  
 " at the same time: they will be either Swiss  
 " or drafts from the French Army in Switzer-  
 " land. I shall also give directions to the same  
 " effect from the interior of the Rhine, as soon  
 " as the conscription and formation of the new  
 " corps will permit it, which I flatter myself  
 " will be in a very short time.

(Signed)

" SCHERER."

From such positive promises as these, I was  
 surely justified in flattering myself with hopes on  
 the occasion; and they were realized in the follow-  
 ing manner: The 13th Frimaire (December 3),  
 a courier arrived from General Joubert, with the  
 information that the King of Naples had com-  
 menced hostilities in Italy. I had every reason  
 to presume that so weak a power would not  
 have dared to attack a powerful Republic which  
 had ever been victorious, without an assurance  
 of support from the House of Austria. I con-  
 sidered, therefore, this unexpected aggression as

a notice to keep on our guard. I accordingly took every precaution to prevent surprize, and to put myself in a condition to execute the orders of the Directory. I compressed the cantonments; and united the right wing of the Army between Straßbourg and Huninguen, and the left between the Lahn and the Nidda, which was the line of demarcation prescribed by the treaties. I ordered the Generals to hasten the formation of the battalions in garrison, so that in case of being put in motion, the march of the Army would not be impeded by conscripts, without arms or clothing. At the same time I wrote a letter to the Executive Directory, from which I give the following extract.

*“ 13th Frimaire, 7th year of the Republic.*

“ I have this moment received, by a courier  
 “ extraordinary, a letter from General Joubert,  
 “ which announces, that the Neapolitans have  
 “ commenced hostilities by the attack of the  
 “ Roman Army. It is to be presumed that they  
 “ would not have taken such a step without the  
 “ certainty of being powerfully seconded by the



" Austrians. General Joubert there solicits me  
 " to give such a position to the Army of Mentz,  
 " that the Emperor may not be at liberty, to em-  
 " ploy his whole force in Italy: but the weak  
 " state of my Army, will not permit me to dis-  
 " turb the enemy by any very important dispo-  
 " sition. I ardently desire the arrival of the reinforce-  
 " ments, which the Minister of War promised  
 " me, in order that I may take a respectable  
 " position: but what can I do with twelve demi-  
 " brigades, and from eight to nine thousand  
 " cavalry, comprehending the troops in garrison,  
 " dispersed over eighty leagues. What move-  
 " ment can I undertake, having the conquered  
 " countries to maintain, and the blockade of  
 " Ehrenbreitstein to form and to cover. All the  
 " accounts and information which I receive an-  
 " nounce an approaching rupture. You will see,  
 " on the perusal of the annexed paper, which  
 " comes from very respectable authority, how far  
 " we may reckon on the good faith of the Austrian  
 " Cabinet. I am instructed by another account,

“ which has been sent me from Mannheim, that  
 “ an officer of artillery and an Austrian commissary,  
 “ sary, are arrived there, in order to evacuate that  
 “ place of its ordnance, and to conduct it to  
 “ Phillipsbourg; where Austrian cannoneers, disguised  
 “ as simple inhabitants, are to be conducted, in order to serve it.

“ In these circumstances, Citizens Directors, I  
 “ must entreat you to communicate to me your  
 “ plan of the campaign, in case of a rupture,  
 “ that I may be able to consider and make myself  
 “ completely master of it. In order to prevent  
 “ all possibility of surprize, I am proceeding  
 “ to take every necessary precaution; and  
 “ have in consequence, &c. &c.”

The Minister of War, who had also been informed by General Joubert of the renewal of hostilities in Italy, wrote to me on the 16th Frimaire (6 Dec.), the following letter:

“ I acquaint you, my dear General, that the  
 “ Neapolitans have commenced hostilities, and

“ attacked the French troops in the Roman  
 “ Republic. General Championet has orders to  
 “ give them battle.

“ Sardinia, at the same time, is in arms against  
 “ us; and the Army of General Joubert is on  
 “ its march to Turin, to possess itself of Pied-  
 “ mont, and to secure our communications, by  
 “ that state, with the Cisalpine Republic.

“ It does not yet appear that the Austrians  
 “ have made any hostile movement; but, at all  
 “ events, you will take such precautions as your  
 “ military discretion shall dictate in the present  
 “ circumstances, and direct all the general officers  
 “ under your command to be vigilant, and in  
 “ such a state of preparation as your actual force  
 “ will permit.

“ I am endeavouring, by all the means in my  
 “ power, to accelerate the formation of the new  
 “ demi-brigades, in order that you may receive  
 “ the necessary reinforcements. In the mean time,  
 “ nothing is neglected that may hasten the levy



“ of six Swiss demi-brigades, which are appoint-  
 “ ed to reinforce the Army of Helvetia; which  
 “ will, in fact, be an accession of strength to you.

“ Be persuaded, my dear General, that I will  
 “ do every thing that depends upon me, to put  
 “ you in a condition to ensure victory to the arms  
 “ of the Republic.”

In the account I gave to the Directory and to the Minister, of the measures I had taken to prevent all surprize, and to make the most of the very weak Army under my command, I repeatedly called their attention to the very mortifying and painful situation in which I was placed. I earnestly called for reinforcements, and did not conceal the imminent dangers that threatened me. At all events, my correspondence remains, and will justify me in the opinion of every just and honest man. As for the unjust and the malignant; as those who are interested in heaping blame upon me, I shall not endeavour, for a moment, to convince them, as they are prepared to shut their eyes against the most incontestible evidence.

In this manner did I express myself in a letter to the Minister of War, on the 19th Frimaire (9th December).

“ It is not to be doubted, if the war should recommence, that the Austrians will present themselves before me with a great superiority of force ; and I ask,—What shall I be able to do with such a feeble army as mine ?

“ I recall, therefore, with great earnestness, to your remembrance, the promise you have made to send me reinforcements ; without which I cannot flatter myself that I shall be able to resist the efforts that the enemy will, undoubtedly, make to throw me back upon the left bank of the Rhine, in order to facilitate its operations against the Army of Italy.

“ I must also observe to you, that, by contracting my cantonments, the army will find it a difficult matter to sustain itself, the country being actually exhausted, and forage becoming every day more scarce. On the Upper Rhine they are in want of it altogether.

“ I have also informed you, that there are no  
 “ magazines; and that the garrisons are with-  
 “ out any store of provision. In short, our situ-  
 “ ation still answers the distressing description  
 “ which I have already made known to you,  
 “ by my preceding communications.

“ In such a critical situation, Citizen Minister,  
 “ it is my duty to expose to you the urgent na-  
 “ ture of our necessities; being persuaded that  
 “ you will do every thing that depends on your  
 “ exertions to secure the safety of this frontier,  
 “ by sending me those reinforcements which  
 “ are absolutely indispensable; as well as by  
 “ taking into your most serious consideration  
 “ our present wants, as they relate to horses,  
 “ provisions, and money for the reparation of  
 “ the pontoons and train of artillery.

“ But be that as it may, I will do my utmost  
 “ to prove myself worthy of the confidence with  
 “ which the government has honoured me; and  
 “ I shall endeavour to employ the army in the  
 “ best manner possible, by resisting the attacks



“ of the enemy, till you have enabled me to  
 “ assume an offensive appearance : but unless  
 “ that is effected, there is every reason to appre-  
 “ hend, that, encouraged by my inactivity, the  
 “ Emperor will turn all his force towards Italy,  
 “ and obtain advantages to which he could have  
 “ no pretensions, if I were in a condition to  
 “ take active measures on the opening of the  
 “ campaign.”

I did not suffer the Directory or the Minister  
 to remain ignorant of the situation of the army.  
 I did not cease my solicitations for assistance in  
 men, provisions, and horses ; and continually in-  
 sisted on the absolute necessity of affording me  
 immediate supplies. What a strange fatality,—  
 what a crooked policy, what secret combinations,  
 have rendered my entreaties fruitless ! I have,  
 however, fulfilled my duty, and my conscience is  
 at rest. The republic, however, has experienced  
 great misfortunes from this neglect of me ;—  
 thousands of brave men have perished from the  
 same cause ; and soldiers accustomed to com-  
 mand victory have suffered defeats. But let these

misfortunes be attributed to the power, which contented itself with making promises that it never realised; which gave orders to pass the Rhine without providing the means of engaging in an advantageous contest with the enemy. Is the General then to be punished for the defective energy of the Legislature? Is he to expiate, by the most afflicting disgrace, the courageous resistance with which he opposed those measures that were inconsistent with the rights of the people? What unheard of vengeance; that a whole army should be sacrificed to ruin one man! What idea can be formed of the conscience, the morality, and the patriotism of an administration capable of these combinations? Such abominable conceptions are worthy the tyrannical genius of Machiavel, that deadly enemy of freedom.

The Directory appeared, nevertheless, to feel the necessity of an army on the Rhine, that should be strong enough to undertake offensive operations, at the opening of the campaign: and it must be considered as a great misfortune, that the promises of the Minister, in his letter of the

21st Frimaire (11th December), of which I shall present an extract, were not carried into effect.

“ I acquaint you, Citizen General, that it is  
 “ the desire of the Executive Directory, that you  
 “ immediately remove your head-quarters to  
 “ Strasbourg, and that you detach to the Upper  
 “ Rhine twelve battalions of foot, and six regi-  
 “ ments of horse.

“ Though it does not appear probable, at  
 “ present, that the Austrians meditate an  
 “ attack upon us; nevertheless, I recommend  
 “ you to pay a very diligent attention to their  
 “ several movements.

“ I am employed, at this time, in contriving to  
 “ send you a reinforcement of troops. The 27th  
 “ and 89th demi-brigades are already under  
 “ marching orders to join the army of Mentz.

“ I shall send you eight other demi-brigades,  
 “ as soon as the new demi-brigades, de-  
 “ signed to replace them in the interior, are or-



ganized : and I assure you, that I exert myself  
to the utmost in accelerating the formation of  
these new corps, in order to supply you, as  
soon as possible, with the necessary reinforcement.

The Helvetic Directory has agreed to furnish France with six complete demi-brigades ;  
and I have just remitted the funds for the organization of these corps, which, I hope, will  
be ready in a month. This levy, which Schaw  
embourg is employed to form, will enable  
you to draw from Switzerland seven French  
demi-brigades to reinforce the Army of the  
Danube.

As I have already informed you, the Army  
of Helvetia forms the right of your army, we  
shall accordingly strengthen it, in concert with  
you, with the force it requires ; and will send  
to your army its supernumerary troops.

It is at this time composed of thirteen demi-  
brigades, four regiments of light cavalry, four

“ companies of light artillery, and ten compa-  
 “ nies of artillery infantry.

“ That of Mentz consists of eleven demi-bri-  
 “ gades, comprehending the 66th, which is in  
 “ Belgium, twenty-six regiments of dragoons,  
 “ including the four which are in the nine united  
 “ departments, and the third regiment of Hus-  
 “ sars, which is at Liege, with fourteen compa-  
 “ nies of horse, and thirty-eight companies of  
 “ foot artillery.

“ If the conscripts arrive, as I hope, to com-  
 “ plete your brigades, the two demi-brigades  
 “ of Holland shall remain with you : so that your  
 “ army will then consist of thirteen demi-bri-  
 “ gades ; to which will be added two more that  
 “ I am on the point of sending you.

“ In fifteen days, or two decades, I reckon  
 “ that you will have thirty battalions, properly  
 “ equipped and fit for actual service ; and, in a  
 “ short time after, I shall endeavour to dispatch  
 “ to you eight other demi-brigades, forming six-

“ teen battalions, which will make a total of  
“ forty-six.

“ The organized Swifs, and the battalions fur-  
“ nished by Switzerland, will form fourteen more,  
“ fo that your army will then confift of fixty  
“ battalions, which is the whole augmentation  
“ that my efforts can produce for your army.

“ It is fome time fince I have ordered a levy  
“ of fix thousand Horfes to reinforce your caval-  
“ ry; and within fix decades I have commanded  
“ a fecond levy of fix thousand more; fo that  
“ previous to the opening of the campaign  
“ your army will, I hope, be augmented with  
“ fix thousand horfes, and that the reft will  
“ follow.

“ I have alfo ordered fifteen hundred artillery  
“ horfes for your Army, and I have given direc-  
“ tions that all thofe which are in the interior  
“ fhall be fent to you; fo that your wants in that  
“ particular will not only be fupplied but ex-  
“ ceeded.



“ At the opening of the campaign, therefore,  
 “ supposing that our enemies do not begin too  
 “ soon for us, your Army will consist of sixty bat-  
 “ talions: that of Helvetia will contain twelve;  
 “ besides eighteen Swiss battalions, thirty  
 “ regiments of cavalry, eighteen companies  
 “ of light, and forty eight of infantry artillery.

“ There will remain also in garrison, to guard  
 “ the fortresses behind you, thirty battalions,  
 “ with some regiments of cavalry.”

The perusal of this letter overcame me with joy; and made me look forward to the return of those days of prosperity, whose remembrance was equally dear to the General and his Army. In the transport of enthusiasm which I felt on the occasion, I exclaimed, in the presence of several of my officers, “ If the Minister keeps his  
 “ word, before the end of the campaign, I shall  
 “ be at Vienna.”—In fact, was it possible for me to harbour a suspicion, that the reputation of a General, the glory of an Army, and the fortune of the Republic, would be sacrificed to concerted

plans of treachery. However, the demi-brigades which were promised me from the interior were not arrived, even when I quitted the Army, and the six Swiss demi-brigades were never formed. It will appear, on the contrary, that the regiments of cavalry entered on the campaign with no more than from two hundred and fifty to three hundred horses: and that when the Army of the Danube received orders to pass the Rhine, it consisted of twenty-eight battalions, instead of the sixty which had been promised to my hopes.

After such a detail, the Commander in Chief will no longer be calumniated; and admiration and gratitude will wait upon those brave warriors, whose courage was not abashed by the superiority of the enemy against whom they combated with republican intrepidity.

I answered the Minister the 26th Frimaire, (16th December). After giving him an account of the orders I had issued for the execution of the movement which had been pre-

scribed to me, and having urged him to exert himself respecting the subsistence of the Army, I continued as follows:

“ I return you thanks, Citizen Minister, for  
 “ the details you have given me respecting the  
 “ reinforcements that you propose to send me.  
 “ If circumstances will permit you to execute  
 “ your design, and if the Austrians delay their  
 “ commencement of the campaign, I shall be  
 “ very sensible of the pains you will have taken  
 “ to give me so fine an Army; and I will en-  
 “ deavour hereafter to make it triumph over the  
 “ enemies of the Republic.”

While I was condemned to a painful state of inactivity, and waited in vain the accomplishment of the brilliant promises which had been made me, new successes gave fresh splendor to the armies of the Republic. Championet, at the head of an handful of brave men, repulsed the Neapolitan Army, and every thing seemed to justify the presage, that Naples would not long resist these intrepid heroes. Who could



have believed, that such prodigies of valour should have been lost to the liberty of the people ; that they should have served only to present such an extraordinary spectacle, as that of a conquering General, punished by a Republican Government for having overturned a throne. Virtue was accused by crime, baseness triumphed over heroism ; while that fine country the conquest of a few days, became the prey of those insatiable blood-suckers, which have dishonoured the French name by their violence and extortion.—At length, deprived of its defenders, it submitted again to the yoke of its ancient masters ; offering the horrid picture of proscription and revenge ; as well as of the punishment, captivity and death of those high-minded men and generous enthusiasts, whose hearts had glowed at the name of liberty ; who had called us to them by their wishes, and had supported us by their courage ! what a wretch he must be, who can view these mournful scenes, without feeling his heart oppressed and his eyes moistened with tears ; without being transported with indignation against the authors of such numerous disasters. Such an one, has neither the

feelings of a man or a citizen, and is not less estranged from humanity than from his country.

It was at the epocha of this brilliant conquest, that the Austrians made certain movements on the Lech and the Adige. They formed a junction of their troops, and seemed disposed to commence hostilities. The Executive Directory received from their diplomatic agents the most positive information of this circumstance; which they transmitted to me: and, on the 24th Nivose, (January 13th,) I addressed the following letter to them.

“ Citizens Directors; I have received the intelligence, conveyed to me in your dispatch of the 18th, on the motions of the Austrian Troops. I have also received, from my emissaries, the same information as that which you have transmitted to me. General Massena has conveyed to me a letter of General Joubert, which announces the junction of the Austrian Troops on the Adige, and that they manifested a disposition to attack him. An Army

“ of sixty thousand men is also formed on the  
 “ Lech ; and, from all appearances, the Austrians  
 “ meditate the recommencement of hostilities.”

“ Although I have already, and with frequent  
 “ remonstrances, made known to you the real  
 “ situation of the Army ; I consider it as my  
 “ duty, in the present circumstances, to repre-  
 “ sent as concisely as possible, the picture of its  
 “ present state and condition,

“ The Army now consists of twelve demi-bri-  
 “ gades of infantry, which form twenty-four bat-  
 “ talions for the field, and twelve battalions for  
 “ the garrisons.

“ The twelve garrison battalions are dispersed  
 “ in different places on the Rhine, from Dussel-  
 “ dorf to Huninguen. Only a part of them are  
 “ armed and equipped ; nor can they be pro-  
 “ vided with what they want, till the arms and  
 “ clothing are arrived.

“ The places of the first line are without any



“ stores of provisions, and it becomes me to in-  
 “ form you, that notwithstanding all the promi-  
 “ ses which have been made to that effect, they  
 “ are destitute of every thing:—at the present  
 “ moment, the provisions at Mentz are exhaust-  
 “ ed. \* \* \* \* \*

“ The magazines of the Army continue  
 “ to be in the same state, as I have already  
 “ represented in my different reports. The  
 “ Army is maintained from day to day, and  
 “ frequently by very extraordinary means:  
 “ and I must add, that, without the zealous ex-  
 “ ertions of the administrators of the depart-  
 “ ments of the Upper and Lower Rhine, and  
 “ the good will of their inhabitants, the ser-  
 “ vice must have entirely failed, at the very  
 “ moment when the troops arrived at their des-  
 “ tination.

“ I have already said that the Army contain-  
 “ ed twenty-four battalions: I should also have  
 “ added, that it has nine thousand horse, and  
 “ five thousand artillery.

“ After the surrender of Ehrenbreitstein, the  
 “ Army, capable of entering upon action, will  
 “ amount to about thirty-three thousand men.

“ \* \* \* \* \*

“ The French Army in Helvetia, which is  
 “ given in charge to me, by the letter of the  
 “ Minister, dated the 1st of Frimaire, (1st of  
 “ December,) to regulate its movements and  
 “ military operations, is composed of thirteen  
 “ demi-brigades of infantry, four regiments of  
 “ light cavalry, four companies of light and ten  
 “ companies of infantry artillery, which will  
 “ form an Army fit for service of about thirty  
 “ thousand men.

“ As it does not belong to me to take cogni-  
 “ zance of what passes in Switzerland, I do not  
 “ know how General Massena will dispose  
 “ of his Army; and if the thirteen battalions  
 “ in garrison, out of the thirteen demi-bri-  
 “ gades which are in Switzerland, will be suffi-  
 “ cient to preserve the tranquillity of the coun-  
 “ try. But supposing that to be the case, you

“ must perceive, Citizens Directors, that the  
 “ whole disposable force of the Republic, from  
 “ Mount Saint Gothard to Duffeldorf, consists  
 “ of two Armies, which together amount to  
 “ no more than sixty three thousand men.

“ Having thus brought to your view, Citizens  
 “ Directors, the real situation of our active force,  
 “ permit me to say one word upon that which  
 “ the enemy may oppose to us.

“ According to the various accounts which  
 “ have reached me, Austria has an actual Army  
 “ of three hundred and twenty thousand men.  
 “ Nor is there any reason whatever to doubt of  
 “ the speedy approach of a Russian corps. \* \* \*

“ By this statement you must perceive, that if  
 “ the enemy marches two hundred thousand  
 “ men into Italy, there will still remain an im-  
 “ mense superiority over the Armies of Mentz  
 “ and Helvetia. I do not pretend to be initiated  
 “ in diplomatic secrets, but I feel it my duty, in  
 “ my Character as Commander in Chief, to



" whom you have been pleased to entrust, the  
 " safety of this frontier of the Republic, to ob-  
 " serve, that it would be highly imprudent to  
 " march our troops into the Tyrol and Bavaria  
 " if we did not possess an Army of Observation  
 " on the Rhine; without which Holland, our  
 " fortresses on the Rhine and in Belgium, \* \*  
 " \* \* \* \* \*  
 " \* \* \* \* \*  
 " \* \* \* \* \*  
 " in short, the communications of the Army,  
 " would be exposed to the attacks of the ene-  
 " my's troops, who will certainly quit Bohemia  
 " to approach the Maine.

" The Minister of War, by his letter of the  
 " 21st Frimaire (11th December), had encour-  
 " aged me to hope that the Armies of Mentz  
 " and Helvetia would be advanced to ninety  
 " battalions for the field, thirty regiments of  
 " cavalry, eighteen companies of light, and  
 " eighteen companies of infantry artillery. If I  
 " could flatter myself that I should possess such  
 " a body of troops under my command, at the

“ opening of the campaign, I should be animat-  
 “ ed with the hope of adding new lustre to the  
 “ arms of the Republic : but as their arrival de-  
 “ pends on the raising, the organizing, the arm-  
 “ ing and equipment of the Swiss demi-brigades,  
 “ and of several demi-brigades in France ; as I  
 “ well know, from the information which I have  
 “ received, that these operations are very tardy in  
 “ their advancement ; as, in short, there is every  
 “ appearance that the Austrians will not delay  
 “ the recommencement of hostilities ; I have too  
 “ much reason to apprehend that the promises  
 “ of the Minister will be too late in their ac-  
 “ complishment. But be that as it may, Citi-  
 “ zens Directors, I will do the utmost in my  
 “ power, with the troops that are allotted me,  
 “ to prove myself worthy of your confidence ;  
 “ and if I cannot, from the inadequate means I  
 “ possess, fulfil all my wishes, I flatter myself  
 “ that I shall be so fortunate as to check the  
 “ superior force of the enemy, and to retain the  
 “ conquests we have won. \* \* \* \* \*

“ \* \* \* \* \* ”

I suppress many other letters, to avoid a tiresome repetition. But in all of them I continually reverted to the same object,—the afflicting description of the Army. Entreaty succeeded entreaty to obtain succour; nor was I wanting in my remonstrances on the evils to which the troops would be exposed, if reinforcements and supplies were delayed. But I never received any answer whatever from the Directory, and flattering promises were all I received from the Minister.

In the mean time, General Dallemagne informed me, 6th Pluviose (12th January), that the garrison of Ehrenbreitstein had proposed to evacuate the place. That fortress, though it belonged to the empire, had been blockaded by the troops of the Republic, according to the orders of the Executive Directory. As the garrison, in this situation, could not receive any succour, it was at length reduced to such a state as to be wholly without subsistence.



The Commanding Officer at first proposed to leave a company of his garrison by way of safeguard ; he demanded also to take with him all the artillery, ammunition, train-equipage, and military effects. This proposition was rejected ; and the Imperial Commander, conscious of the impossibility of holding out any longer, made the following propositions to General Dallemagne, which were accepted.

“ *Ehrenbreitstein, 23d January 1799.*

“ *The Commanding Officer of the Fortrefs of Ehren-*  
 “ *breitstein to Citizen Dallemagne, General of*  
 “ *Division, commanding the blockade of the said*  
 “ *Fortrefs.*

“ **CITIZEN GENERAL,**

“ My proposition of yesterday respecting the  
 “ manner in which I had designed to evacuate  
 “ Ehrenbreitstein, although founded on the prin-  
 “ ciples which I had laid down in the declara-  
 “ tion, contained in the same letter, not having  
 “ obtained your assent ; nothing remains for me,  
 “ Citizen General, but to send you the arrange-

“ ment agreed upon, in the conversation held  
 “ by you and the officers who had been autho-  
 “ rised by me for that purpose; viz.

“ ART. 1. The garrison under my command  
 “ shall evacuate the fort the 27th January, at  
 “ nine o'clock in the morning. It shall be form-  
 “ ed in two columns; the first of which shall  
 “ take up their quarters at Montaubert, and the  
 “ second at Wallendard and its neighbourhood,  
 “ from which it shall depart on the 28th.

“ ART. 2. The garrison shall march out with  
 “ drums beating, colours flying, lighted matches,  
 “ and their arms and baggage.

“ ART. 3. It shall take with it two field-  
 “ pieces for each battalion, and one caisson,  
 “ making a total of seven six, and two four-  
 “ pounders.

“ ART. 4. The battalions shall take with them  
 “ their tents and camp utensils, in carriages or  
 “ on horses, which shall be provided for their

“ transport; as well as the records, archives,  
 “ and every thing that is not absolutely attached  
 “ to the place.

“ ART. 5. As the garrison is provided with  
 “ a very small number of horses, for the trans-  
 “ port of the artillery, military effects, and bag-  
 “ gage, the necessary measures shall be taken  
 “ to furnish it with saddle and draught horses,  
 “ as well as waggons, till it has passed the line  
 “ of neutrality.

“ ART. 6. It shall direct its route by Frank-  
 “ fort on the Maine, passing through Mont-  
 “ aubar, Limbourg, Camberg, and Hænickein,  
 “ where the whole shall arrive on the 2d of  
 “ February. It shall receive every kind of con-  
 “ venience and accommodation, be allowed to  
 “ make short marches, with one day of rest  
 “ for the first column at Limbourg on the Lahn,  
 “ and for the second at Montaubar.

“ ART. 7. It shall be sufficiently furnished  
 “ with bread, meat, and forage, till its arrival  
 “ at the line of neutrality.



" ART. 8. The officers who cannot take all  
 " their effects with them shall be allowed to  
 " deposit the remainder at Thal, or in any other  
 " place which they shall chuse. They shall also  
 " be at liberty to dispose of them, and perfect  
 " security shall be granted. The same permis-  
 " sion shall be allowed respecting the archives,  
 " &c. which, on account of their bulk, will not,  
 " at present, admit of being transported.

" ART. 9. The invalids, whether officers or  
 " soldiers, &c. the individuals of the body-guard  
 " of his Highness the Elector of Treves, who  
 " are not in a state to perform military duty, as  
 " well as the artists, tradesmen, &c. shall remain  
 " at Thal; or shall obtain, if they require it,  
 " the necessary passports, to remove with their  
 " effects, and without obstruction, wherever  
 " they shall think proper.

" ART. 10. The sick, who cannot be trans-  
 " ported, shall remain in the lower fortress,  
 " which they now occupy. They shall be taken  
 " care of at the expence of their Sovereign, by

“ the officers of health who shall be left for that  
 “ purpose, with an officer and a detachment of  
 “ ten men. On the re-establishment of their  
 “ health, they shall follow the garrison, subject  
 “ to the same conditions.

“ ART. 11. The ladies of the officers, with the  
 “ wives and children of the soldiers who do not  
 “ accompany the garrison, shall enjoy perfect secu-  
 “ rity in their persons and properties ; and shall  
 “ have the liberty to remain at Thal, or to remove  
 “ to any place agreeable to themselves.

“ ART. 12. The Garrison shall take away, be-  
 “ sides the arms which the soldier carries in his  
 “ own person, those which belong to their re-  
 “ spective companies.

“ Receive the assurance of my high esteem, and  
 “ of the distinguished consideration with which  
 “ I am,

“ Citizen General,

“ Your very humble

“ And very obedient servant,

“ (Signed) Colonel DE FABER.”

"The twelve articles above cited are received,  
"and accepted by me, General of Division, com-  
"manding the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein.

(Signed)

"DALLEMAGNE."

"Coblentz, the 5th Pluviose (24 Jan.), in  
the 7th Year of the French Republic,  
one and indivisible,"

The possession of this place procured great advantages to the Republic. It restored to the active service of the Army, the troops which were employed in the blockade of it, and secures a place of retreat to the forces who are in service on the Maine, by its strong tête de pont, on the right bank of the Rhine. It also offers an opening, by which the Armies of the Republic may with great ease penetrate into Germany, a country, which, if we may be allowed to form conjectures from political probability, will long continue to be the theatre of war. In the fort was found 144 brass and 48 iron cannon, 90,443 balls of every calibre, 15,229 bombs, 60,000 grenades, 4900 artillery powder cartridges, 4000 ball cartridges, near a million of cartridges for the infantry, 376,000 pounds of common powder,



6000 pounds of fine powder, 38,000 bullets, 5197 musquets of different calibres, 2880 cartridge boxes, with howitzers, and other military stores.

In my account to the Directory of the surrender of Ehrenbreitstein, I discharged a duty and felt a pleasure, in offering to General Dallemagne and the troops which he commanded, the tribute of praise which they had so well deserved.—The following letter expressed my sentiments on the subject :

“ General Dallemagne speaks in very advantageous terms of all the corps who have been employed at the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein, and in a particular manner of certain officers.

“ I entreat you, Citizen Directors, to afford to the latter the testimony of your approbation, which, on every account, they so well merit. General Dallemagne has also a claim to the highest praise. He accelerated the reduction of the place, by his activity, his zeal, and

"military dispositions.—You have just granted  
 "him the retreat which he solicited, and he well  
 "deserves that some proof of your regard should  
 "accompany it."

My impatience for the completion of the Minister's promises encreased in proportion as a renewal of hostilities became more decided. The agents and emissaries of Government had sufficiently instructed me on that subject.—Was it possible for me to believe, that there could exist any other interest than that of the Republic ; or any other wish but to preserve it ? Suspicion had never yet found access to my heart. If ignorance can ever be a blessing, it is when it prevents us from discovering the wickedness of men ; and surrounds us with pleasing delusions. If, however, the truth is at length unfolded to us, we become a prey to grief and dejection ; we despair of the age in which we live ; and are almost compelled to hate mankind, when we see the corruption of which they are capable.

Instead of reinforcements so often demanded, and as often promised, I received a general instruction for the several Armies, and a statement of the composition of the Armies on the Rhine; which, without giving me one additional man, seemed to subject one hundred and fifty thousand to my disposal. I cannot dispense with presenting this document to the public, that it may perceive with what address and perfidy my demands were eluded; and be able to trace, with greater facility, the events that followed.

*Instructions on the Destination and general Movements of the Armies on actual Service at the Moment when Hostilities shall be renewed.*

If hostilities should be renewed in Germany and Italy, there will be five Armies in a state of preparation for actual service. The Army of Mentz, the Army of Helvetia, an Army of Observation on the Rhine, the Army of Italy, and the Army of Rome.

The French Army in the Batavian Republic, will continue, till it receives further orders, to



cover the frontiers and territory of that Republic. But it may suffer a reduction of from fifteen to twenty thousand men; and the surplus of its forces shall be appropriated to the Army of Observation.

*The Disposition and Destination of the Armies on actual Service.*

THE ARMY OF MENTZ.

As soon as hostilities shall be renewed, the Army of Mentz, composed, according to the annexed table, of about forty-six thousand men, of every military denomination, is particularly destined to act in Suabia and Bavaria.

This Army must be immediately provided with a park of Artillery, magazines of provisions, carriages, equipments, and commissaries, proportioned to its strength, and regulated according to its destination; which is to be constantly acting in a country varied by plains and defiles, and sometimes intersected by rivers.

It shall be collected, with the least possible delay, between Huninguen and Landau, and disposed

in such a manner, as to be able to make its way into Suabia by Kehl and Hüninguen, on the first order of the Directory, or the first act of hostility, on the part of the Austrians.

It shall advance by rapid marches, and in several columns, to the sources of the Danube, by traversing the Black Mountains. It will proceed from thence, between that river and the Lake of Constance ; its right pushing forward beyond the Lake, so as to bear upon Bregentz.

On a supposition, that, from the position or force of the enemy, or by gaining upon him from very active marches, the Army of Mentz could advance at once to the Upper Lech ; it should make that movement, and execute it with the utmost rapidity, to prevent the Austrians from passing that river.

The probability of success in this expedition is particularly applicable to the supposition that hostilities may be commenced by the French Army.

When the Army of Mentz is arrived at the Danube, it shall take the name of the Army of the Danube. Its right will then be supported by the left of the Army of Helvetia, and it will consider as a principal object, the facilitating the march of the latter into the Grisons and the Tyrol. The successive movements that it will be able to make, on the Lech, the Iser, and the Inn, must be regulated by the dispositions of the enemy; having it always in view to possess the openings of the Tyrol by Bavaria,

#### THE ARMY OF HELVETIA.

The Army of Helvetia, composed of about thirty thousand men, and to which will be added the Helvetic demi-brigades, who are in a state to enter on the campaign, is destined to invade the country of the Grisons and the Tyrol.

The left and the centre of this Army will pass the Rhine, between Bregentz and Moyensfeld: part of which is to advance upon Coire, and part upon Bregentz, of which it is to get possession.



The right of the Army of Helvetia, composed of the demi-brigades which are at Ballinzone, and supported by an equal number of troops, detached from the Army of Italy in the Walte-line, shall march to Glarentz by the Walteline, and from thence to Botzen and Brixen.

The left and the centre of that Army, after having got possession of Bregentz and of Coire, and after leaving sufficient troops to guard those points, will unite to gain the source of the Inn, by forcing all the passages up to Inspruck, of which they will render themselves masters.

When the right of the Army is arrived at Brixen, the Army of Italy will be able, if circumstances require it, to withdraw its troops from thence, if it should be pressed by a superior enemy, or be any way necessary to its operations.

When the Army of Helvetia has possessed itself of Bregentz, it will assume the name of the Army of the Tyrol. It is under the com-

mand of General Maffena, but in all the grand movements and operations of the war, subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army of Mentz.

In consequence of this disposition, the Commander in Chief of the latter Army, may, as circumstances require, draw off to his right and employ a part of the Army of Helvetia, observing, at the same time, that it is absolutely necessary for the success of the campaign, that this Army should get possession of the valley of the Inn and the city of Inspruck.

#### THE ARMY OF OBSERVATION,

An Army of Observation on the Rhine shall be formed and organized with the utmost expedition.

The command of it is entrusted to General Bernadotte. It consists of forty-eight thousand men, including the garrisons of different fortresses on the Rhine, and is appointed to cover all the fortified places and bridges on that

river, from Huninguen to Duffeldorf, as well as the country upon its left bank.

It is charged with continuing the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein, the operation to be undertaken against Phillipsbourg, and to support, at the same time, the motions of the Army of Mentz, by the appearance of troops on various points; particularly on the Maine, the Neckar, and the Ens.

It will furnish garrisons for the towns on the Rhine, sometimes employ their force, by way of defence, and sometimes, as it may be necessary, for the maintenance of good order, and the security of public establishment, according as these places may be more or less menaced, by the respective positions of the French and hostile Armies.

It will detach the troops that may be necessary for the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein; and the surplus of the Army, which will be, to speak with more accuracy, the disposable corps, will form, in considerable force, on the right bank of the



Rhine, before Mentz, between the Lahn and the Maine, in order to advance by the Landgraviate of Hesse d'Armstadt, to Manheim and Phillippsbourg.

This corps will act as circumstances shall suggest, on either bank of the Rhine ; considering it as principal objects to support the operations of the Army of Mentz, to possess itself of Ehrenbreitstein and Phillippsbourg, and to cover from invasion the left bank of the Rhine.

This Army, though conducted by a Commander in Chief, shall be subordinate to the General commanding the Army of Mentz for the grand movements and operations of the war.

#### ARMY OF ITALY.

The Army of Italy, composed of about fifty thousand disposable troops, on the Adige and the Po, exclusive of the Cisalpine, Ligurian, Piedmontese, and Polish forces, shall act to the left of Trent.

The main body of the Army shall pass the Adige towards Verona, and, after taking that town, shall necessarily drive the enemy behind the Brenta and the Piava.

The corps detached from this Army in the Walteline, shall take the direction of Glarens, Robzen, and Brixen, in concert with the corps of the Army of Helvetia in the Canton of Bellinzona.

On its arrival at Brixen, this corps will rejoin the left of the Army of Italy, if the enemy should be in such force as to render it indispensable; or that it should be necessary to the successive operations of the Army of Italy.

This Army is also destined to possess itself of Tuscany, on the first orders it shall receive to that effect.

If the Army should be in possession of more than fifty thousand French troops, in that case the surplus shall serve to cover Piedmont and the

Cisalpine, and to recruit the Army on active duty.

ARMY OF ROME.

The Army of Rome will proceed in the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, and when arrived there will take the name of the Army of Naples.

It is charged to afford succour to the islands of Corfou and Malta.

The plan for the conduct of the war, being fully settled, and transmitted to the Commanders in Chief, points out to them the series of operations which they are to execute: and they will adhere to it, till they receive contrary orders from Government.

Approved by the Minister of War.

(Signed)

SCHERER.



## TABLE

*Of the Composition of the Armies on the Rhine.*

## Troops on the Batavian Territory.

|                                                                       |                    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 10 Field battalions, 7 battalions in<br>garrison, total 17 battalions | 9,438 men.         |
| 4 Squadrons — — —                                                     | 414                |
| 7 Companies of foot artillery —                                       | 575                |
| 1 Company of horse artillery —                                        | 76                 |
| Total                                                                 | <u>10,503 men.</u> |

*Army of Mentz.*

|                                                                                                    |             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 15 Demi-brigades, forming 30 bat-<br>talions of field troops, at 2,224<br>men the demi-brigade — — | 33,360 men. |
| 18 Regiments of horse, forming 68<br>squadrons — — —                                               | 8,847       |
| 16 Companies, foot artillery                                                                       | 1408        |
| 10 Ditto, horse ditto                                                                              | 756         |
| 1 Ditto, workmen ditto                                                                             | 100         |
| 6 Ditto, pontoneers                                                                                | 400         |
| 6 Ditto, fappers                                                                                   | 1200        |

|                    |       |                         |
|--------------------|-------|-------------------------|
| 1 Company, miners  | 100   |                         |
| 1 Ditto, aerostats | 61    |                         |
|                    | <hr/> | 4,013                   |
| Total              |       | <hr/> 46,232 men. <hr/> |

*Army of Observation.*

|                                             |   |   |                         |
|---------------------------------------------|---|---|-------------------------|
| 10 Field battalions                         | — | — | 8,349 men.              |
| 24 Garrison battalions                      | — | — | 22,104                  |
| 15 New-raised ditto                         | — | — | 7,536                   |
| 11 Regiments of horse, forming 38 squadrons | — | — | 4,986                   |
| Artillery and engineers                     | — | — | 4,291                   |
| Total                                       |   |   | <hr/> 47,266 men. <hr/> |

*Army of Helvetia.*

|                                                                        |   |   |                         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|-------------------------|
| 13 Demi-brigades, forming 26 battalions, at 2,224 men the demi-brigade | — | — | 28,912 men.             |
| 7 Garrison battalions                                                  | — | — | 6,776                   |
| 8 Squadrons                                                            | — | — | 1,212                   |
| Artillery and engineers                                                | — | — | 1,832                   |
| Total                                                                  |   |   | <hr/> 38,732 men. <hr/> |

## General Recapitulation.

## French Army on the Batavian ter-

|                  |   |   |              |
|------------------|---|---|--------------|
| ritory           | — | — | 10,503 men,  |
| — of Mentz       | — | — | 46,232       |
| — in Helvetia    | — | — | 38,732       |
| — of Observation | — | — | 47,266       |
| Conscripts       | — | — | 7,000        |
| Total            |   |   | 149,733 men. |

There is such a palpable uniformity between the Memorial which I presented to the Director, and the tenor of the Instructions, that the purport of the latter may be readily traced from the opinions of the former. It may be said, indeed, to differ from it in nothing but the number of troops it appoints to each Army: but this difference was very important, as it destroyed all the hopes that I had conceived from a plan matured by experience and reflection. Nevertheless, if the troops, set forth in the table annexed to the copy of Instructions, had in reality joined the Army, the Republic would have



preserved its military glory. The Generals of France could not, perhaps, flatter themselves that they should immediately obtain any decisive advantages, over hostile armies so much more numerous than their own; but the French would not then have seen those laurels withered, which were gained by such prodigies of valour: the first days of the campaign would not have been distinguished by defeats, and a reverse of fortune, which was the more fatal, as it tended to damp the ardour of the French youth, who, for the first time, approached the tented field; and, having lived amid the seductions of aristocracy and royalism, in the interior parts of the kingdom, required the splendour of victory to fortify and confirm their wavering patriotism. Victories were also necessary to invigorate our ancient warriors, who may have lost, in a long period of inaction, a part of that energy and military enthusiasm, which can only be nourished by the daily habitude of dangers and of combats. We also stand in need of success, that we may prove our superiority to our new enemies, the ferocious soldiers of the North. Is it possible that

such considerations as these could escape the Directory? They are not the fruits of great political genius or acquired by profound reflection: no, they are obvious to all, and will force themselves on the most ordinary understanding.

There never was a moment when it was more essentially necessary to develope and employ the most powerful expedients. If Royalism conspires on all sides,—if civil war is kindled in several of our departments, to whom shall we impute these dire misfortunes; these notorious calamities; but to the evil genius which, in preparing such disasters for our Armies, re-inspires the presumptuous hopes of our domestic enemies.

It is altogether needless, at this time, to disclose the picture of which we have traced the faithful outline: it will be sufficient to place in the view of the reader, a correct representation of the Armies on the Rhine, when they received orders to begin the campaign. It requires no more than fair comparison of one with

the other to be convinced how shamefully I have been deceived by promises, as flattering as they were fallacious.

Fatigued and worn out by reiterated solicitations which obtained nothing, I sent Adjutant General Daultanne, to the Directory and the Minister, to represent to them the real situation of the Army, as well as the danger which I foresaw, from the division they made in the command of it, by appointing two Generals in Chief. He signified to them my desire that a Corps of Observation should be formed on the Rhine, and at the same time, communicated my opinion that it should be commanded only by a General of Division; and that it would be altogether useless to leave so large a body of cavalry and old troops as they proposed; because these different corps would be rendered more effective with the Army of the Danube, than if they remained on the Rhine. In short I did not conceal the discontent I felt at an operation, which diminished the strength of the Army by dividing



the command of it. I accordingly made the following observations.

“ If the division of my command had been  
 “ suggested to you, Citizens Directors, from a  
 “ want of confidence in my military talents, it  
 “ would be much more conducive to the pub-  
 “ lic welfare, to invest some one with it whom  
 “ you may think more deserving of it. I have  
 “ proved more than once, that I desire to occu-  
 “ py my post no longer than my services are be-  
 “ neficial to the Republic : and I should rejoice,  
 “ if I were replaced by a soldier better in-  
 “ structed in his duty, and more capable of  
 “ commanding than myself.”

I received letters both from the Directory and the Minister full of confidential and affectionate expressions. Nevertheless, the delays continued to be prolonged, so as to occasion a renewal of my disquietudes, and began at length to inspire me with distrust. I perceived, with an equal degree of grief and indignation, that there was no intention to grant me a force sufficient to suf-

tain the glory of the Republican arms. Every thing confirmed these sad forebodings. Fifteen battalions of new levies were appointed, to the Army of Observation, which if they had immediately arrived, were not in a condition to enter on the service of the campaign. It would have been much more conformable to well-known military principles, if these raw battalions had been appointed for the interior duty, and the five old demi-brigades had been sent to the Army. The ten battalions which were appointed to augment it, as well as a great part of the cavalry, were still in Belgium and in Holland: nor was I informed when they would arrive. Of the eighteen Swiss battalions which had been so long promised me, there was not one in a state even of organisation. From a want of fresh horses and other objects of equipment, the *dépôts* of the cavalry were encumbered with men who, on that account, were rendered altogether useless; while the squadrons on duty, especially those of the heavy horse, were reduced below one half of their established complement.

A malevolence so evident, a desire to fill me with disgust, and a design to ruin me, of which it was not possible for me to entertain the least doubt, furnished me with motives all-sufficient to request my dismissal. But in adopting such a measure at the opening of a campaign, I should have furnished my enemies with new arms against me. In short after having quitted the Legislative Body to take the command of an Army, should I not have had reason to fear the displeasure of my country, if I had abandoned the career on which I had lately entered. I determined, therefore, to oppose an invincible courage to the inveterate hatred of those who had sworn my destruction.

The inevitable dangers that encompassed me round about, no longer alarmed me. Misfortune and persecution inspire pure and honest minds with a degree of energy, of which we do not suppose ourselves susceptible in the tranquil seasons of life. A warrior, in the field of honour looks death in the face with the most perfect composure: but it requires the resolution of



a Stoic to support the whispering manœuvres of perfidy ; to abandon oneself, in some sort, to the stiletto of treason. I foresaw nevertheless, some glimmering of hope : and I no longer insisted on the danger of dividing the command, when I was about to share it with an enlightened soldier, a true Republican, and a sincere friend ; with General Bernadotte. I flattered myself that he had been so fortunate as to obtain, from the Minister, the forces which had been promised to him ; and that, acting in concert, we should be able to surmount a part of the obstacles that troubled us. The Minister, in the mean time, gave the most positive assurance that we should have an Army of one hundred thousand men ; and though I was fully persuaded that the Archduke would have an hundred and twenty thousand, in Germany, the Tyrol and the Grisons, I did not despair of combating him with advantage. A fresh letter of the Minister of war, dated the 20th Pluviose, (8th February,) proves that I did not cease to continue my vain and fruitless solicitations.

“ The Brigadier General Daultanne,” said  
 the Minister, in this letter, “ has transmitted  
 “ me both your letters of the 16th Pluviose, (4th  
 “ February,) one respecting the new arrangement  
 “ of the Army of Mentz, after the appointment of  
 “ an Army of Observation, and the other rela-  
 “ tive to the existence, destination, and employ-  
 “ ment of the latter Army. When I have sub-  
 “ mitted them to the Directory, I shall hasten  
 “ to answer you,

“ In discussing with you, my dear Gene-  
 “ ral, these different subjects, you will per-  
 “ ceive, I hope, that it has never been the  
 “ intention of government to weaken your  
 “ forces, or to limit your command; and I  
 “ am persuaded, that you would think the  
 “ same, if you had before you the instruc-  
 “ tions given to General Bernadotte, which  
 “ has suffered a delay in being sent to you, in  
 “ order to add the list of those promotions that  
 “ were necessary for organizing the Staff of the  
 “ two Armies.

“ You asked for a reinforcement of six field  
 “ battalions, thirty squadrons, four companies  
 “ of light, and ten of foot artillery, and two  
 “ companies of sap-men.

“ But you must well know that, in the pre-  
 “ sent situation of things, it is impossible to send  
 “ you infantry, as it must be drawn from the  
 “ interior, where there are already but few  
 “ troops ; and they are absolutely indispensable,  
 “ not only to preserve good order on the eve of  
 “ the elections, but likewise to line the coasts,  
 “ which are menaced by a considerable arma-  
 “ ment that is now preparing in England, which  
 “ at once alarms us for the coasts of Holland  
 “ and those of the Western Channel.

“ I perceive, with real concern, the painful  
 “ apprehensions that you discover concerning the  
 “ fate of the campaign. From the state of the  
 “ forces at your disposal, you consider, in par-  
 “ ticular, the Army of Mentz as being too  
 “ weak ; but be so good as to reflect, that the  
 “ enemy, whatever force he may be supposed to



" have, must be under the necessity of dividing  
 " it; that—

" The Army of Mentz amounts to 45,000 men.

" That of Helvetia — 30,000

" The Army of Observation, that

" forms a disposable corps, of

" between 20,000 and — 25,000

" All of which will form an united

" force from 95 to — 100,000 men.

" And surely these forces, put in motion by one  
 " head and on the same plan, may well contend  
 " for victory with an hundred, or an hundred  
 " and twenty thousand Imperial troops; espe-  
 " cially if these three Armies contract their po-  
 " sitions in their respective attacks, which is the  
 " most decisive mode to employ against the  
 " Austrians, accustomed to great movements,  
 " which always fail in some part or other of  
 " their execution; as must be the case from the  
 " nature of things. But, after all, do you think  
 " it possible that the enemy, with all its force,  
 " could place in one military position, more than  
 " from forty to fifty thousand men.

" In short, as soon as the crisis of the elec-  
 " tions is passed, and we shall be free from  
 " alarms on our coasts, I will endeavour to draw  
 " some troops from the interior, in order, if it  
 " be possible, to furnish the six battalions that  
 " you demand."

The reading of this letter will leave, without  
 doubt, a very painful impression in the mind of  
 every true citizen. Tyranny appears, in every  
 part to betray itself, by a most inconfide-  
 rate discovery of its hidden secrets.

Wherefore, let me ask, did the Directory think  
 itself obliged to retain so many troops in the in-  
 terior of the Republic? Was it, in reality, as  
 he says, to maintain the public tranquillity dur-  
 ing the crisis of the elections? Was it not ra-  
 ther to domineer over the will of the people by  
 the terror of the bayonet; to keep at a distance  
 from the Legislative Body the true friends of li-  
 berty; and to introduce into it the vilest slaves of  
 power? Artful speeches, and imperious procla-  
 mations dispersed everywhere, furnish somewhat

more than a mere presumption respecting its views of despotism and usurpation. The union of the people in its public assemblies, is an act of sovereignty which ought to be secure from all influence; for whose result the supreme magistracy should wait with respect, and which they would have no reason to fear, if their own consciences were free from reproach. Here is a notorious crime heightened by a two-fold enormity: that of having endeavoured, in contempt of the constitution, to command the votes of the citizens, by a display of military force; and by thus keeping it back from the army for such a purpose, to have caused the death of thousands of brave men, by forcing them to contend with the far superior numbers of the enemy.

Is it not astonishing that the Directory should be informed, by the organ of its Minister of War, that a French Army of from ninety-five to an hundred thousand men, were able to *contend* for victory with an hundred, or an hundred and twenty thousand of the Imperial troops? If indeed the Minister had kept his word, we should,



I doubt not, have done something more than *contend* for victory. But what do all these strange expressions signify? Is it for nothing more than to maintain a painful, insignificant contest, that the Republic continues to war with the enemies who have sworn its ruin? Do not its finances and interior situation imperiously demand an immediate termination of this desolating plague; and, to attain that happy æra, is it not required that great power and equal means should be brought into action?—Must war, carried on by the Republic, become, as it was under the old institution, an object of calculation for the ambitious, a fruitful source of riches for the rapacious, and of misery for the people?—Did we not know that this enthusiasm, which has worked wonders for us, would not last for ever; especially when so much has been done to extinguish it?—What then ought the government to do?—The answer is at hand.—The government ought to have opposed the enemy with such a formidable power as to have compelled it to ask for peace: or, if hostilities should be renewed, to have enabled us to penetrate into its territories. By

adopting such measures, and pursuing such a conduct, we should have spared, as I have already said, the finances of the nation and the blood of its citizens: the Legislative Body would not then have been urged by dire necessity to impose new taxes; because our armies, numerous as they might have been, by subsisting themselves in an enemy's country, would have cost nothing to the Republic, while the contributions it might have levied would have fed the public treasure. The conscripts, who are intimidated by the reports of our defeats, and the recital of those privations to which our warriors are condemned, would then have rushed eagerly to the frontier, where they would have been summoned by the song of victory. Perfidious authors of the calamities of France, think you that you shall impose on it by your accusations? Think you—that you shall escape the indignation, the contempt, and public odium you deserve, by your attempts to brand those men with infamy who are guilty of no crime? The people were not long deceived respecting the causes of our disasters; which would never have

been a mystery, but from the efforts you made to chain down thought, to arrest every pen, and to load with persecutions those generous spirits, that glowed with a love of the Republic.— From the borders of the Rhine, from the banks of the Danube, from the rocks of Helvetia and the plains of Naples, the blood of many thousand victims accuses you;—it rises up against you, and calls down upon your guilty heads the detestation of the earth, and the justice of Heaven.

Never was a more notorious example of treason presented to the eyes of a people. The Armies were reduced to a peace establishment at a period when nothing was more certain than the renewal of a most alarming war. The tardy progress of negotiations, and the bad faith of foreign negociators, would not have encouraged the least hope of pacification, if we had been employed in recruiting the Army, in remounting the cavalry, in repairing the artillery: if the conscript youth had not been disgusted by the absolute want and cruel neglect which they experi-



enced, victory would not have deserted our standards; our ancient enemies and the slavish hordes of the North, would not have had cause to boast of one successful effort: it would then have been their fate to have lamented a succession of defeats. But it appears that to make the nation triumph was a far less important care, than to oppress the Republicans, to maintain an Army of spies, to countenance every species of iniquity, to despoil the people of all its rights, and to reduce them, in the bosom of a Republic, to the slavery of Morocco and Constantinople.

Nevertheless the accounts which reached me, as well as those which were transmitted to the Directory by its diplomatic agents\*, gave posi-

---

\* Citizen Alquier, Minister from the Republic to the Elector of Bavaria, and Citizen Baker agent of the Directory at Ratisbon, are the persons who transmitted to the Directory as well as to myself the most authentic and particular information. Nevertheless the former met with a very cold reception on his return to Paris, because, as it is said, he had not given sufficient notifications respecting the forces of the House of Austria. It is much more probable, that the disgrace of this valuable Citizen, proceeded for his not having restrained him-

tive intelligence, that the Austrians were uniting their forces, and that the Russians had already reached the hereditary states of the House of Austria: I accordingly addressed, the 7th Pluviose (26th January), the following letter to the Minister of war:

“ I have this instant received a note by means  
“ of the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the French  
“ Republic at Rastadt, giving a very parti-  
“ cular account of the Austrian troops in Bava-  
“ ria, which appears to amount to fifty four  
“ battalions of

|                           |       |             |
|---------------------------|-------|-------------|
| “ 1200 Men each           | — —   | 64,800 men. |
| “ 64 Squadrons of 200 men |       | 12,800      |
|                           |       | <hr/>       |
|                           | Total | 76,600 men. |

self from expressing his astonishment at seeing a recommence-  
ment of hostilities with a force so inferior to that of the enemy.  
I have thought it needless to insert in these memoirs the origi-  
nal reports of these two Citizens; but if they should discover  
that what I have said respecting the strength of the Austrian  
troops is not conformable to the truth, I solicit them to di-  
vulge it to the public.

“ But this number does not comprehend the  
 “ Bavarian and Russian troops, or the artil-  
 “ lery; much less the train, and other essential  
 “ parts of the Army.

“ Having communicated to you this account,  
 “ which I have every reason to consider as per-  
 “ fectly correct, it becomes me to urge you,  
 “ Citizen Minister, seriously to reflect on the  
 “ evident difference that exists between these  
 “ forces, and our own in this quarter, as well as  
 “ re-examine the different letters which I have  
 “ written to you on this subject.

“ It must be observed that the troops which  
 “ were in the Tyrol, in the Grisons, and in Bohe-  
 “ mia, are not comprised in this statement; and  
 “ that all these troops, united as they now are,  
 “ form an Army of one hundred and twenty thou-  
 “ sand men, divided into two corps: one of forty  
 “ thousand men, which directs its operations  
 “ against the Army of Helvetia; and one of  
 “ eighty thousand which acts against that of the  
 “ Danube.”



I dispatched several persons to the banks of the Lech, and to Stutgard, to instruct themselves respecting all the movements of the Austrians. I knew that an Army of from twenty-five to thirty thousand men, had quitted Bohemia, and directed its course towards the Lech: I learned also that the Archduke was making very serious preparations on the same river, and manifested a disposition to begin the campaign. I transmitted an account of all these movements to the Directory and the Minister; and the latter conveyed to me a general order for the commanders in Chief to enter on the campaign. I think it my duty to submit it to the attention of the public.

*2d Ventose, in the 7th year of the Republic.*

“ The Executive Directory issues the following instruction for the Commanders in Chief  
“ of the Armies of Italy, of Mentz, of Helvetia,  
“ and the Army of Observation on the Rhine.

“ The Austrian Government having neglected  
“ to answer the pressing note which had been

“ delivered from the French Ministers Plenipo-  
 “ tentiary at Rastadt, and its silence being con-  
 “ sidered, according to the tenor of that note,  
 “ as an hostile aggression ;

“ The Commander in Chief of the Army of  
 “ Mentz will, without delay, march the Army  
 “ that he commands beyond the Black Moun-  
 “ tains, and occupy the sources of the Neokar  
 “ and the Danube, as well as the positions parti-  
 “ cularly specified in their former instructions.

“ The General Commandant of the Army of  
 “ Helvetia, called by the people of the Grisons  
 “ to purge the country of those factions spirits  
 “ who had invited the Austrian forces thither,  
 “ will take a sufficient number of troops and  
 “ make himself master of the Grison country.  
 “ He will then take his military line of de-  
 “ fence ; and occupy, on his left, the country  
 “ belonging to the House of Austria in Voral-  
 “ berg, if that line should be necessary to the  
 “ security of his position. He will keep ano-  
 “ ther body of troops in the environs of Schaff-

" haufen, to support the movements of the Army  
 " of Mentz posted at the sources of the Neckar  
 " and the Danube.

" As the General of the Army of Helvetia  
 " will have been called by the Grisons to deliver  
 " their country from an Austrian armed force  
 " which oppresses it; he will send a staff officer  
 " to the General who commands the Austrian  
 " troops at Coire, to signify to him his entrance  
 " into the Grison country, and to convey an  
 " order for him to evacuate it two hours before  
 " his entrance; in default of which, he shall be  
 " under the necessity of driving them back,  
 " wherever he shall find them.

" The General of the Army of Observation  
 " will organize, with the utmost promptitude, the  
 " Army which he commands; and, in conformity  
 " to the instructions which he has received, he  
 " will post himself, with all possible expedition,  
 " between the Maine and the Neckar, to sup-  
 " port the active operations of the Army of  
 " Mentz.



“ The Generals of the Army of Mentz and  
 “ Helvetia are ordered, previous to their en-  
 “ trance into the countries already mentioned,  
 “ to publish the following proclamation in the  
 “ French and German tongues.

“ The troops of the Army of Italy stationed  
 “ in the Walteline, will second the movements  
 “ of the Army of Helvetia, by proceeding at  
 “ the same time as far as Saint Mary.

“ The Minister of War is commanded to give  
 “ particular orders and instructions for the exe-  
 “ cution of these general directions.”

I had no sooner received them, than I made every disposition in my power to execute the orders of the Directory. I formed my Army in five divisions, one of which was the advanced guard, and the other a body of reserve.

I shall now present to the reader a correct Table of these Divisions, that he may become acquainted with the genuine force of the Army.

In comparing this Table with those of the Minister, he will recollect the brilliant promises which he made, and will be able to form an accurate judgment of the good faith of Government.

**ARMY OF MENTZ.**  
**STATEMENT of the Situation of the ARMY at**  
**the Epocha of the 9th Ventose, (27th Febru-**  
**ary,) in the 7th Year of the Republic.**

---

**GENERAL STAFF.**

**JOURDAN, Commander in Chief.**

**ERNOUF, General of Division, Chief of the Staff.**

**MARENOT, General of Division, Commandant of**  
*Engineers.*

**LAMARTILLIERE, General of Division, Commandant**  
*of Artillery.*

**LEMAIRE, Brigadier-General of Artillery.**

**DAULTANNE, Brigadier-General.**

**MOLITOR,**  
**HASTREL,**  
**BARBIER,**  
**DACLOU,**

*} Adjutants General.*

**VAILLANT, Chief Commissary, &c.**

**INSPECTORS-GENERAL.**

**HARVILLE,**  
**BOURCIER,**

*} for the Cavalry.*

**DUBOIS-CRANCE, for the Infantry.**



## ADVANCED GUARD.

LEFEBURE\*, *General of Division, Commander in Chief.*

VENDAMME, *General of Division.*

KLAINE, *General of Division, commanding the Cavalry.*

SOULT, } *Brigadiers General.*  
LAVAL, }

DROUET, } *Adjutants General.*  
FONTAINE, }

| NAMES OF THE CORPS.                                | ACTUAL ARMED FORCE. |      |        |      |
|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------|--------|------|
|                                                    | Inf.                | Cav. | Artil. | Sap. |
| 25th Demi-brigade of Light Infantry, - - - - }     | 2132                | —    | —      | —    |
| 53d Ditto of the line, - - -                       | 2032                | —    | —      | —    |
| 67th Ditto, - - - - -                              | 2128                | —    | —      | —    |
| 4th Regiment of Hussars, - -                       | —                   | 520  | —      | —    |
| 5th Ditto, - - - - -                               | —                   | 598  | —      | —    |
| 1st Regiment of Chasseurs, -                       | —                   | 589  | —      | —    |
| 17th Regiment of Dragoons, -                       | —                   | 395  | —      | —    |
| 1st Com. of the 3d Reg. of Light Artillery, - - }  | —                   | —    | 83     | —    |
| 27th Company ditto, - - -                          | —                   | —    | 80     | —    |
| 1st Comp. of Infantry Artillery, -                 | —                   | —    | 113    | —    |
| 6th Ditto, - - - - -                               | —                   | —    | 116    | —    |
| 7th Comp. of the 3d Battalion of Sapmen, - - - - } | —                   | —    | —      | 177  |
| Total,                                             | 6292                | 2102 | 382    | 177  |

\* General Lefebure was not yet arrived at the Army ; and General Vendamme was appointed to supply his place till his arrival.

ADVANCED GUARD  
FIRST DIVISION.

FERINO, *General of Division.*

THAREAU, }  
LABOISSIERE, } *Brigadiers General.*  
JACOPIN, }

LAVAL, }  
DEFRANCE, } *Adjutants General.*

| NAMES OF THE CORPS.                                         | ACTUAL ARMED FORCE. |      |         |      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------|---------|------|
|                                                             | Inf.                | Cav. | Artill. | Sap. |
| 10th Demi-brigade of Light Infan-<br>try, - - - - - }       | 2195                |      |         |      |
| 46th Ditto of the Line, - - -                               | 2102                |      |         |      |
| 102d Ditto, - - - - -                                       | 2155                |      |         |      |
| 6th Regiment of Chasseurs, -                                |                     | 588  |         |      |
| 11th Regiment of Dragoons, -                                |                     | 400  |         |      |
| 1st Comp. of the 6th Reg. of }<br>Light Artillery, - - - }  |                     |      | 71      |      |
| 4th Comp. ditto, - - - - -                                  |                     |      | 70      |      |
| 12th Comp. of the 3d Reg. of }<br>Infantry Artillery, - - } |                     |      | 170     |      |
| 17th Comp. ditto, - - - - -                                 |                     |      | 170     |      |
| 5th Comp. of the 3d Battalion }<br>of Sapmen, - - - - - }   |                     |      |         | 192  |
| Total,                                                      | 6452                | 988  | 481     | 192  |

## SECOND DIVISION.

SOUHAM, *General of Division.*

DECAEN, } *Brigadiers General.*  
GOULUS, }

LORCET, } *Adjutants General.*  
BERTRAND, }

| NAMES OF THE CORPS.                                           | ACTUAL ARMED FORCE. |      |        |      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------|--------|------|
|                                                               | Inf.                | Cav. | Artil. | Sap. |
| 2d Demi-brigade of the Line,                                  | 2174                |      |        |      |
| 7th Ditto, - - - - -                                          | 1395                |      |        |      |
| 83d Ditto, - - - - -                                          | 2081                |      |        |      |
| 1st Regiment of Dragoons, -                                   |                     | 458  |        |      |
| 6th Ditto, - - - - -                                          |                     | 389  |        |      |
| 3d & 4th Comp. of the 7th Reg. }<br>of Light Artillery, - - } |                     |      | 123    |      |
| 15th Comp. of the 2d Reg. of }<br>Infantry Artillery, - - }   |                     |      | 82     |      |
| 13th Comp. of the 7th ditto, -                                |                     |      | 112    |      |
| 1st Comp. of the 3d Battalion }<br>of Sapmen, - - - - }       |                     |      |        | 161  |
| Total,                                                        | 5630                | 847  | 317    | 161  |



## THIRD DIVISION.

SAINT CYR, *General of Division.*LEGRAND, }  
DAUNIER, } *Brigadiers General.*  
VALTER, }DEBILLY, } *Adjutants General.*  
SALIGNY, }

| NAMES OF THE CORPS.                                      | ACTUAL ARMED<br>FORCE. |      |        |      |
|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------|--------|------|
|                                                          | Inf.                   | Cav. | Artil. | Sap. |
| 1st Demi-brigade of Light In-<br>fantry - - - - - }      | 1342                   |      |        |      |
| 1st Ditto of the line - - -                              | 1483                   |      |        |      |
| 108th Ditto - - - - -                                    | 2019                   |      |        |      |
| 8th Regiment of Chasseurs -                              |                        | 492  |        |      |
| 10th Ditto - - - - -                                     |                        | 432  |        |      |
| 2d Regiment of Dragoons -                                |                        | 429  |        |      |
| 4th and 6th Company of the<br>3d Regiment of Infantry }  |                        |      | 137    |      |
| Artillery - - - - - }                                    |                        |      |        |      |
| 5th Company of the 3d Re-<br>giment of Light Artillery } |                        |      | 88     |      |
| 20th Company ditto - - -                                 |                        |      | 76     |      |
| 3d Company of Sapmen of the<br>3d Battalion - - - - - }  |                        |      |        | 193  |
| Total                                                    | 4844                   | 1353 | 301    | 193  |

BODY OF RESERVE.

D'HAUPOUL, *General of Division.*

COMPÈRE, } *Brigadiers General.*  
OSWALD, }

ORMENÇAY, } *Adjutants General.*  
COLLIN, }

| NAMES OF THE CORPS.                                    | ACTUAL ARMED FORCE. |      |        |      |
|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------|--------|------|
|                                                        | Inf.                | Cav. | Artil. | Sap. |
| 8th Demi-brigade of the line -                         | 1486                |      |        |      |
| 50th Ditto - - - - -                                   | 1411                |      |        |      |
| 1st Regiment of Carabineers -                          |                     | 339  |        |      |
| 2d Ditto - - - - -                                     |                     | 304  |        |      |
| 4th Regiment of Cavalry - -                            |                     | 240  |        |      |
| 6th Ditto - - - - -                                    |                     | 291  |        |      |
| 7th Ditto - - - - -                                    |                     | 257  |        |      |
| 8th Ditto - - - - -                                    |                     | 438  |        |      |
| 23d Ditto - - - - -                                    |                     | 408  |        |      |
| 25th Ditto - - - - -                                   |                     | 293  |        |      |
| 5th Company of the 6th Regiment of Light Artillery - } |                     |      | 60     |      |
| 2d Company of the 7th Ditto -                          |                     |      | 79     |      |
| 2d Company of the 3d Regiment of Infantry Artillery }  |                     |      | 136    |      |
| 3d Company ditto - - - - -                             |                     |      | 88     |      |
| 2d and 4th Companies of the 3d Battalion of Sapmen - } |                     |      |        | 365  |
| Total                                                  | 2897                | 2567 | 333    | 365  |

PARK OF ARTILLERY.

|                                    |                             |      |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------|
| LARIBOISSIERE,                     | } Commanders of Brigade.    |      |
| BRICKET,                           |                             |      |
| BOURGEAT,                          | Commander of the Squadrons. |      |
| GROSECLAUDE,                       | } Commanders of Battalions. |      |
| PICOTEAU,                          |                             |      |
| CUNY,                              |                             |      |
| OFFICERS                           |                             | 60   |
| NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND CAN- |                             |      |
| NONEERS                            |                             | 1329 |

TOTAL 1389

Cannon distributed in the Divisions and at the Park.

| Of 4 | of 8 | of 12 | howitzers | Total |
|------|------|-------|-----------|-------|
| 33   | 21   | 7     | 19        | 80    |

RECAPITULATION.

| NUMBER OF DIVISIONS.    | ACTIVE FORCE. |      |        |      |      |
|-------------------------|---------------|------|--------|------|------|
|                         | Infant.       | Cav. | Artil. | Sap. | Can. |
| The Advanced Guard      | 6292          | 2102 | 382    | 177  | —    |
| First Division - - -    | 6452          | 988  | 481    | 192  | —    |
| Second Division - - -   | 5650          | 847  | 317    | 161  | —    |
| Third Division - - -    | 4844          | 1353 | 301    | 193  | —    |
| Body of Reserve - - -   | 2897          | 2567 | 333    | 365  | —    |
| Park of Artillery - - - | —             | —    | 1398   | —    | 80   |
| TOTAL                   | 26,135        | 7857 | 3203   | 1088 | 80   |



To this force must be added the Army of Helvetia, which consisted of thirty thousand men.—So that the whole amounted to sixty-eight thousand men; and if the artillery and sappers are deducted, these two armies will be reduced to about sixty-two thousand cavalry and infantry.

*Such were the powerful means, more powerful even than the Republic had ever possessed, which were submitted to my disposal; and it was with these means that I was ordered to challenge the forces of the House of Austria, under the command of the Archduke Charles; which, according to the most authentic accounts, as well as to the most moderate calculation, amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand fighting men. These boasted means would indeed have been more powerful, if the Swiss brigades had been organized; if the troops appointed to join the Army of Observation had not been retained in the interior till the period of the Elections was past; and if the cavalry had been furnished with fresh horses, and other objects of equipment.*

After I had made the necessary dispositions, I gave notice to General Bernadotte, Commander in Chief of the Army of Observation, that the Army of Mentz would pass the Rhine on the 11th Ventose, (1st March). I requested that General, therefore, to invest Philippsbourg, with as much vigour as the feeble means which he possessed would allow. I also solicited General Massena, Commander in Chief of the Army of Helvetia, to possess himself of the Grison country, while the Army of Mentz penetrated beyond the Black Mountains.

That Army passed the Rhine the 11th Ventose, (1st March). The advanced guard, the second and third division, and the body of reserve, filed off by the Bridge of Kehl. The first division, which was collected in the environs of Huningue, filed off by the Bridge of Basle, and the Army began its march in four columns: that of the right, commanded by General Ferino, which was composed of the first division, proceeded, by the forest towns, to Blomberg; at the same time that General Massena ordered

a demi-brigade to Schaffhausen; in order to establish and secure the communications of the Army of Helvetia with that of Mentz; which will now assume the title of The Army of the Danube.

The second column, commanded by General Haupout, composed of the body of reserve and two squadrons of hussars, took his line of march by the Valley of Fribourg and Neustadt, to Löffingen, Breulingen, and Hüssingen.

The third column, commanded by the General in Chief, which was composed of the advanced guard, of the second division, and the park of artillery, proceeded to Willingen by the Valley of the Kinch,

The fourth and last column, commanded by General Saint Cyr, directed its march to Frensdorf and Rotveil, by the Valley of Oberkirch and Kenubis.



I caused the proclamation of the Directory to be dispersed, as well as one of my own, which I thought it necessary to prepare.

*Proclamation of the Executive Directory.*

“ The troops of his Majesty the Emperor and King of Hungary and Bohemia, in violation of a convention concluded at Rastadt, the 11th Frimaire, (1st December,) in the year 6, have re-passed the river Inn, and quitted the hereditary states.

“ This movement has been combined with the march of Russian troops; who declare aloud, that they are come to attack the Republic.

“ Ever faithful to its engagements; always animated by the sincerest desire of maintaining peace, and fully disposed to believe that his Imperial Majesty entertained the same sentiments, the French government has demanded of him a satisfactory declaration respecting the march of the Russian troops, and the passage which has been granted them.

"The Emperor, however, has thought proper to maintain a perfect silence on this important subject. The Executive Directory, therefore, finds itself compelled to engage in a necessary defence; and, by the obligations imposed on all governments to provide for their safety, to distribute the French armies in such positions as the existing circumstances require. At the same time it proclaims an unalterable desire of peace; and that, whenever his Majesty the Emperor shall announce, by an amicable declaration, that the Russians have evacuated his states, and that his troops have resumed the stations regulated by the Convention of Rastadt, the French armies shall return to their ancient positions."

Approved by the Executive Directory, the 2d Ventose, (20th February,) in the 7th year of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

*The President of the Executive Directory.*

(Signed) REVELLIERE-LEPAUX.

*The Commander in Chief to the Army.*

Head Quarters at Strasburg, the 11th Ventose,  
(1st March), in the 3th Year.

“Soldiers! in contempt of the most solemn convention, the troops of Austria have been the first to pass the line of demarcation, which had been traced and settled. The Emperor has imposed on the pacific dispositions of the French Government, by inviting into the very bosom of Germany foreign armies, less known by their military prowess than by their spirit of plunder and robbery in the late wars. And while in a scrupulous observance of the faith of treaties you continued behind your lines in a bold but tranquil attitude, that Prince dared to combine his hostile movements with these new allies; and, availing himself of a treacherous silence, took every advantage which was afforded him by your confidence. This manifest infraction—this outrage of the public faith, respected by all civilized nations, has compelled the Executive Directory to enter on reprisals. It has employed every



means to preserve peace: but if war is inevitable, it is prepared for the event.—Soldiers, let us advance from our lines, and enter once more into that career which you have hitherto pursued with so much glory.

“ We will fight—if we find any obstacles in gaining the military positions to which the Army is advancing.—We will fight—if the Emperor does not speedily and rigorously execute the existing convention. But, faithful to the system of moderation, which, to the present moment, has characterised the French nation, we will trace back our steps, we will re-enter our first lines, as soon as the Republic has received the satisfaction which it expects, and has a right to demand.

“ Soldiers,—in taking up arms, remember, that the scourge of war is to be employed only on the enemies of the Republic. Your glory would be effaced, your laurels would be withered, and the wishes of your enemies would be accomplished, if you indulge yourselves in criminal excesses. You well know, that your enemies have practised every possible manœuvre to arm the people

of Europe against the French nation. Let your conduct belie their perfidious calumnies.—Remember that it becomes the Army to respect *general as well as particular property*; and that every species of disorder will be repressed by force, and punished with severity.

“ It is you, above all, who are superior officers, heads of corps and commanders, that I consider as personally responsible for the strict execution of my purposes and those of the Government: Maintain the most rigid discipline; attend to the wants of the troops under your orders; watch over them without intermission: and if, perchance, a soldier should forget his duties, tell him that a base action dishonours the French name. Bid him remember, that he will fully the glory attached to the arms of the Republic, and he will instantly return into the path of good order and honourable conduct.

“ Animated by the principles of justice and of equity, the Executive Directory commands me to give you notice, of its absolute intention to reimburse the people and the governments who

are friends of the Republic, for whatever the unforeseen wants of the Army may exact from them.—On this account it is necessary that the most scrupulous attention should be paid to return the superabundance of any articles that may be required or furnished. I therefore notify to you, in order to prevent all possible abuse, that the Commissary in Chief will alone be authorized by me to enter into agreements for any kind of requisitions; that nevertheless the Generals and Commanders of the troops, in cases of particular urgency, may enter into contracts for the purchase of requisitions; of which, however, they must immediately transmit me a copy;—that, in order to centralise responsibility, these requisitions ought to be made, wherever it is possible, to the superior magistrates;—that, in all cases the Generals, or Commanders of detachments, shall deliver back to the burgomaster or bailiffs the superfluity of whatever may have been furnished;—in short, that no one shall dare to take any thing by force from any person whatever.—I repeat,—that any disobedience to these orders will be punished with the utmost severity. But I hope for other things; and that you, sol-



others, will not impose that painful duty on your  
General.

“By such dispositions as these, framed on the  
principles of justice and fidelity, and worthy of  
the French nation, the inhabitants of Germany,  
no longer alarmed by those reports which have  
been propagated by the malevolence of our  
enemies, will remain calm in the midst of the  
storm.—I trust they will feel that the best method  
they can employ to preserve their property is to  
remain in peace; but if, on the contrary, and  
notwithstanding all the promises I have made to  
them, the French army should find the towns  
deserted and the villages abandoned; if the in-  
habitants should oppose themselves to its march,  
or refuse to provide it with such assistance as is  
in their power; then, I declare with the same  
sincerity, that I will take proper measures to  
punish them, and to make them repent their  
rashness.

*General in Chief.* (Signed) JOURDAN.”

“(A true copy.)”

*General of Division, Chief of the General Staff,*

(Signed) ERNOUE.”

In giving an account to the Directory, on the 11th Ventose (1st March), of the orders which I had issued for the execution of their instructions, I added:

“ It is my duty, Citizens Directors, to place  
 “ under your eyes, the real force of the Army at  
 “ the moment when it entered on the campaign,  
 “ I therefore address to you a small book, which  
 “ contains the exact situation as well as formation  
 “ of each division. I must observe to you, that the  
 “ eighth demi-brigade is not yet arrived, which  
 “ reduces the effective force of the troops on the  
 “ right bank of the Rhine to thirty-six thousand  
 “ men.

“ You will remark, without doubt, a great  
 “ difference between the actual and that of the  
 “ supposed force. This difference proceeds from  
 “ the state of the conscripts, who being neither  
 “ armed, clothed, or disciplined, were not fit to  
 “ complete the field Battalions. I was obliged  
 “ also to leave two demi-brigades with the Army

“ of Observation, as it was wholly destitute of  
 “ old troops.

“ The weak state of the cavalry regiments  
 “ must very sensibly strike you, Citizens Directors;  
 “ and I shall not conceal from you the pain  
 “ which every soldier suffers, to see this Army  
 “ brought to such a reduced state by the fault of  
 “ the contractors, who have not fulfilled their  
 “ engagements.

“ The active part of the Army of Observation,  
 “ existing only on paper, and the effective force of  
 “ that of Helvetia being but thirty thousand men,  
 “ our power is reduced to sixty-six thousand men  
 “ in the two armies of Mentz and Helvetia. You  
 “ must immediately be convinced, if you will or-  
 “ der the different reports that I have made to be  
 “ laid before you, on the strength of the enemy's  
 “ Armies, that we shall have a very superior force  
 “ to encounter.—I will do every thing that de-  
 “ pends on myself; but I must take the liberty  
 “ to observe, Citizens Directors, that the troops  
 “ whom we shall have to combat, are excellent  
 “ and enured to war.”



The advanced guard arrived at Wilingen the 14th. The Army filed off the 15th and 16th, and took up its cantonments beyond the Black Mountains: the right at Blomberg, and the left at Rotweil.

Notwithstanding the proclamation of the Directory, I could not consider myself as in an actual state of hostilities with Austria. It was necessary that I should attend the result of the summons of General Massena, or wait for more precise orders. I was only instructed to march the Army beyond the Black Mountains, and to occupy the sources of the Neckar and the Danube. I wrote to the Directory the 15th Ventose (5 March), and, after having given an account of the movement that the Army had just effected, and offered some observations on the positions which it occupied, I added:—

“ If you will take a comprehensive survey of  
 “ my situation, Citizens Directors, you will ob-  
 “ serve, that, according to the most positive ac-  
 “ counts, the forces of the enemy amount to

“ eighty thousand men on the Lech, twenty-five  
 “ thousand in Franconia, twenty-five thousand  
 “ towards the Lake of Constance and the Grison  
 “ Country, and twenty-four thousand Russians.  
 “ Supposing, therefore, that the Austrians em-  
 “ ploy fifty thousand men to keep in check or  
 “ fight the Army of thirty thousand that is in  
 “ Helvetia, there will remain an hundred thou-  
 “ sand men to act against that which I com-  
 “ mand, and whose effective force is no more  
 “ than thirty-six thousand.—I am not easily  
 “ alarmed; and am firmly resolved to do every  
 “ thing that may depend on me to surmount the  
 “ obstacles that oppose me: but when I reflect  
 “ that the enemy may, by my left, march to the  
 “ Rhine, and consequently get in my rear the  
 “ the body of twenty-five thousand men which  
 “ is in Franconia; and that he may afterwards  
 “ attack me with sixty thousand men; it will  
 “ be far less difficult, I think, for me to find in  
 “ this campaign a death of glory than a crown  
 “ of laurels. I am well aware, Citizens Direc-  
 “ tors, that you had the design to support my  
 “ left and my communications by an Army of

“ and ensured to war”

" Observation, but as that is not yet in existence,  
 " the Army which I command may be brought  
 " into great hazard. It is my bounden duty,  
 " Citizens Directors, to inform you without dis-  
 " guise, of the state and situation of my Army; par-  
 " ticularly when I receive letters from my friends  
 " at Paris, who felicitate me on entering the  
 " campaign with an Army of one hundred and  
 " fifty thousand men.—I take great care to leave  
 " them in their error, but it is my duty to tell  
 " you the truth."

So much pains had been taken to spread  
 abroad the report, that I had one hundred and  
 fifty thousand men under my command; that it  
 was very natural for the first account of my  
 retreat to strike the public with extraordinary  
 astonishment, and indispose it towards me.  
 What then could be the design of that power  
 which placed me in such an afflicting situation?  
 but to rob me of the esteem of my fellow-citi-  
 zens: that esteem acquired by a long series of  
 toils, and those successes which the true Repub-  
 licans will never forget. The project to blast



me, to disgrace me, to destroy me, is so manifest, that I shall not longer dwell on this work of iniquity. My heart would be less oppressed, if I had been the only victim of these atrocious combinations;—but the blood of so many generous warriors is continually before me. I could pardon the authors of my own misfortunes; but my everlasting hatred will follow them, who have sacrificed, without remorse, my brave companions in arms.—With what perfidious art was the real situation of my Army concealed; while the most absurd calumpnies were noised every where concerning it,

Fortunately the Archduke did not dispose the troops which he commanded, to as much advantage as I had apprehended. The twenty-four thousand Russians were sent into Italy; while some of the Austrian troops were also detached to the Tyrol, on a presumption that it might prevent a junction between the Army of Helvetia and that of Italy.—He brought near to him the troops which were in Franconia, and on the frontiers of Bohemia, so that he united an army of eighty

thousand men, while another army of forty thousand marched to assist the corps which were in the Grisons, where happily it did not arrive before that country had been invaded, with such active vigour, by the brave General Massena.

To put the public in a state to judge of the impression that the letter, of which an extract has just been given, made upon the Directory, it is necessary to submit to its examination the answer of the Minister. It will there appear with what insidious treachery he employed his hypocritical adulation, his false reasoning, and insignificant promises, to elude the demands which I was unceasingly renewing; while I never failed to describe, in the most lively colours, the perils which menaced the Army.

*" Paris, 22d Ventose, (12th March,) 7th Year  
of the French Republic, one and indivisible*

*" The Minister of War to General Jourdan.*

*" I answer, Citizen General, by the desire of  
the Directory, the letter that you wrote*

" the 15th Ventose, (5th March,) and of which  
 " I received the copy that you addressed to me.  
 " It has been considered with all the attention  
 " suited to the importance of the observations  
 " with which you accompanied it; and makes  
 " the Directory still more highly sensible of that  
 " just confidence which it has placed in you.

" The comparative state of your forces and  
 " those which are opposed to you, might, in-  
 " deed, occasion some disquietudes, if the Di-  
 " rectory, as well as myself, did not feel the  
 " conviction, that superiority of numbers will  
 " never affright a French army, when it is com-  
 " manded by you. The national vengeance  
 " that is to be exercised against perfidious go-  
 " vernments; the anxious and increasing inte-  
 " rest we feel for peace, which will not be ob-  
 " tained if we do not begin the campaign with  
 " decisive victories; all these motives, inflaming  
 " the ardor of our troops, and seconded by the  
 " wisdom and ability of your military disposi-  
 " tions, must inspire us with a security establish-  
 " ed \* \* \* \* \*.



“ Admitting, however, that the reports of  
 “ Citizen Baker, concerning the number of the  
 “ Austrians, are not exaggerated, your position  
 “ is not less formidable for them:—in effect,—  
 “ you have under your command thirty-eight  
 “ thousand effective men, not including the ar-  
 “ tillery and corps of engineers\*. The Army  
 “ of Observation, which will be formed towards  
 “ the 10th Germinal, (30th March,) will bring  
 “ into the field from fifteen to twenty thousand  
 “ men; and the places on the Rhine being  
 “ in a sufficient state of defence, you may, by  
 “ virtue of your superior authority, order a part  
 “ of that army to join yours, if the Austrians  
 “ should not be numerous in Franconia, or should  
 “ have formed their largest body to oppose you.

“ On the other side, General Massena, whose  
 “ invasion of the Grisons will, I hope, be effec-  
 “ tuated before the campaign opens in Suabia,

---

\* I know not why the Minister persisted in saying that I had  
 38,000 effective men.—See the Statement of the Army when  
 it passed the Rhine.

“ will be in a situation to support your right,  
 “ in your offensive march; and you may avail  
 “ yourself also of General Bernadotte, to rein-  
 “ force the Army of the Danube, with any part  
 “ that you may think proper to take of the  
 “ Army of Helvetia, if circumstances require  
 “ it. The Austrians are numerous, but, with-  
 “ out enlarging on our superior prowess and  
 “ activity, it must be observed, that they have  
 “ an immense country to cover, and that in ad-  
 “ vancing to meet you, they must necessarily  
 “ leave a large portion of their troops behind  
 “ them, either to occupy Bavaria, to defend  
 “ Bohemia, or to guard the intermediate posts;  
 “ so that, in this state of dispersion, the princi-  
 “ pal army, which is destined to act against you,  
 “ does not appear as if it would be superior to  
 “ you, either in strength or numbers.

“ As I have already informed you, the Army  
 “ of Observation will be assembled on the 1st or  
 “ 10th of Germinal (21st or 30th of March). It  
 “ will be composed of twenty battalions of field,  
 “ and eighteen of garrison troops, which, I

" hope, will be complete, with thirty-eight  
 " squadrons. It does not appear that the Auf-  
 " trians can take any hostile measures against  
 " you before the 10th Germinal, (30th March,)  
 " and, by that time, the activity of General  
 " Bernadotte, and the invasion of the Grisons  
 " by General Massena, will give you such a lati-  
 " tude of powers as must presage success. \* \*  
 " \* \* \* \* \*

" I presume, Citizen General, it will afford  
 " you satisfaction to be informed, that notwith-  
 " standing the alarms which the English have  
 " occasioned on our maritime coasts, the Direc-  
 " tory is determined to press on the completion  
 " of the Army of Observation, and put in  
 " instant motion the troops which Holland, and  
 " the united departments have engaged to fur-  
 " nish. In announcing to you these dispositions,  
 " I reiterate the expressions of their high confi-  
 " dence, on the part of Government, and that  
 " my most earnest desire is to see you gather  
 " those laurels which are due to your extraordi-  
 " nary zeal and superior talents.



“ In the course of the campaign you will find,  
 “ that the Directory and its Minister are unceas-  
 “ ingly employed, in providing for your wants and  
 “ encreasing your means :—their intention is to  
 “ second, with their utmost power, those active  
 “ and daring measures, which characterise your  
 “ operations, against troops whose character is  
 “ shaken by their former defeats ; they are per-  
 “ suaded that the Army of the Danube is destined,  
 “ under your command, to gain victories for the  
 “ Republic brilliant as that of Fleurus.”

The Executive Directory had instructed me to  
 occupy the sources of the Danube and the  
 Neckar ; but it had not explained itself relative  
 to the conduct I was to hold, in case I should  
 meet the Austrian Army. After its general or-  
 ders and proclamation, it appeared to me, that  
 I was not to commence hostilities but in case of  
 attack from the enemy ; or unless the French troops  
 should be opposed in their design to occupy those  
 positions, of which I had received orders to possess  
 myself. I considered the movement that the Army  
 had just made, merely as a measure of precaution,

to seize some important posts, which would put us in a situation to second the manœuvres of the Army of Helvetia in the Grison country, on the supposition that the enemy would refuse to evacuate it on the summons of General Massena, and that the latter should be obliged to attack him. From these conjectures, which appeared to me to be well-founded, I confined myself, while I was expecting communications from that General, to reconnoitre the country occupied by the Army, and to rectify its position. I pushed my advanced guard as far as Tuttlingen, to get possession of that important defile, and to be better instructed respecting the operations of the Archduke. I also ordered a bridge of boats to be constructed on the Rhine at Newbrissac; which being placed behind the centre of the Army, secured, in case of unfortunate events, a retreat on the valley of Fribourg. I also ordered some works to be constructed to cover the bridge.

I was informed on the 18th Ventose, (8th March,) that the Archduke had passed the Lech on the the same day, and advanced towards

Suabia. The 20th, (10 March,) the light troops of the advanced guard fell in with some of the enemy's Hussars; but they as well as our own troops had received orders not to attack or to employ arms but in case of aggression. These patrols separated after they had reciprocally acknowledged each other.

Dispatches from General Massena informed me the 22d Ventose, (12th March,) that, on the Austrian General having refused to evacuate the Grisons, he had attacked him on the 18th. At the same time he announced the brilliant success which he had obtained.

Though the Directory had not given me any particular instructions relative to my conduct, in case hostilities should commence in the Grison Countries; I felt that my own patriotism, the honour of the Republic, and the esteem with which a Commander inspired me whose courage and talents had so powerfully contributed to the glory of our arms, would not allow me to let him contend alone with the formidable Army of



the Archduke, It would have been to expose this intrepid hero, and the valorous troops he commanded, to a certain loss. With such a prospect before me, could I hesitate on the part I ought to take?—I accordingly put the Army in motion the 23d Ventose, (13th March,) when it passed the Danube, and established its right at Hohentweil, and the left at Tuttlingen on that river. General Saint-Cyr, who commanded the left of the Army, received orders to leave a body of the flank companies on the left bank of the Danube. This corps was composed of two demi-brigades of infantry, which till then had formed a part of the reserve; and of some squadrons of light cavalry. I entrusted the command to the General of Division Vandamme, who had some days since given up the command of the advanced guard to General Lefebure, and I established myself at Engen.

I dispatched an account of the movement I had made to the Directory, and informed it that I should continue to march towards the Army of Helvetia, unless the Archduke should oppose

me with a force that it would not be prudent for me to resist. I also earnestly requested to be informed of their final intentions.

The Army halted on the 24th (14th March). On the following day it proceeded, and posted itself, the right to the Lake of Constance, the centre at Stockach, and the left on the Danube. The advanced guard encamped at Moorkirch. The left flank companies remained on the left bank of the Danube, and inclined towards the height of Fridingen. I established myself at Stockach. This day the columns fell in with Austrians every where; but as they retired on the summons of their officers, hostilities did not commence. The 25th and 26th were employed in sending out parties to reconnoitre.

The 27th, (17th March,) the Army renewed its march, and encamped, the right at the Lake of Constance, and the left on the Danube:—the right was stationed behind Maredorf, the centre at Pfulendorf, and the left at Mengen:—the flank companies remained on the bank of the

Danube. I fixed myself at Pfulendorf. The Austrian light troops occupied the small towns and villages which it was our object to possess. They had orders not to employ their arms, but the obstacles which they opposed to us plainly proved that it was their desire to force us to an act of aggression. As for myself,—having received no positive order from the Directory, I was determined not to act offensively, unless I should be compelled in my own defence. The Austrians, however, retired, and the truce was prolonged.

The same day, a letter of the Directory, as well as one from the Minister, dated the 20th, (10th March,) acquainted me that a message had been sent to the Legislative Body, to propose a declaration of war against the Emperor and the Grand Duke of Tuscany; and that the Commander in Chief of the Army of Italy had received orders to commence hostilities. The Minister added, that General Bernadotte could not, before the 10th Germinal, (30th March,) establish himself on the right bank of the Rhine, so as to cover my left. He, therefore, desired me to act



in any manner I should think most suitable to the actual state of things.

The Archduke advanced upon me with a very imposing force. He had also detached a considerable corps to Bregentz and Feldkirch, in order to check the progress of General Massena; so that I found myself in a very difficult position. By the advance that I had made to support the Army of Helvetia, my left became totally unprotected. If I had penetrated further onwards, before the arrival of the Army of Observation, I should have exposed that of the Danube to inevitable dangers; besides, the very weak state of that army compelled me to contract it, as much as possible, between the Lake of Constance and the Danube. This line enlarges with the descent of that river; and it would have been impossible for me to occupy it, if I had pushed further onwards. On the contrary, if I directed the main body of the Army to Bregentz, and abandoned the Danube, the Archduke would indubitably have attacked me on my left flank, and have infallibly driven me to the Lake of

Constance; while he would have been able to keep General Massena in check with a very superior force. I determined, therefore, to wait the Army of Observation in the post that I occupied.

The movement which I had made to my right, on leaving Wilingen, in order to get between the Danube and the Lake of Constance, having removed me at a considerable distance from Kehl, I ordered the convoys of the Army to pass, in future, by the Bridges of Basle and Newbrifac, and to reach the Army of the Forest Towns and the Valley of Neustadt. These orders, which were entirely conformable to known military principles, produced, nevertheless, very singular effects. The inhabitants of Wilingen, and of the Valley of Kinch and Oberkirch, perceiving that the French troops were moving off, spread a report, that the Austrians had turned the left of the Army of the Danube, and that they were marching to Kehl to get possession of the Tête-du-Pont, with a view to cut off the retreat of that Army. The Commissaries of War, the free

foldiers and deserters, as well as the Administrations, gave credit to this report on the faith of the inhabitants, who urged them to find security in a speedy flight from the power of the enemy. At length the alarm extended so far, that General Chateauneuf-Randon, commandant of Strasbourg, was persuaded by these false reports that the enemy was within a few leagues of that city. As he was at this time sick, and consequently not in a state to verify the fact himself, and having but a small number of troops under his command, he proceeded, with all possible dispatch, to put in requisition the national guards of the departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine; and informed me, by a courier extraordinary, of these supposed dangers, as well as the measure he had adopted in consequence of them. This panic, which probably originated from malice, seems, however, to have produced some happy effects. It offered to the citizens of these departments an opportunity of displaying their zeal, their courage, and their boundless devotion to the Republic. The emotion was rapid as it was spontaneous: the citizens hastened to every



point which was believed to be threatened, with arms and provisions. This patriotic rapture proves that, in spite of every effort which has been made to sicken Frenchmen of their republican institutions, and to render their country, as it were, odious to them; that, governed as they have been by their fellow-citizens with as oppressive a tyranny as they could have experienced from their most perfidious enemies, they still preserve the most profound horror of every form of foreign dominion. It is to the warrior, who has so often seen before him the last efforts of dying heroism, that it is permitted to speak with enthusiasm of a people, who would have offered such vast and inexhaustible resources, if they had not been so ill governed, or, rather, so basely betrayed:—he is still permitted to indulge the hope, that, in spite of so many dark plots, so many sad omens, so many just causes of alarm, the Republic will at last triumph both over its foreign and domestic enemies.

These reports gave me considerable uneasiness; and though I had not the least knowledge of

this pretended movement of the Austrian Army, it was possible that the Archduke might have concealed it from me : but the accounts of my emissaries, and those which were brought by the different reconnoitring parties, soon convinced me that these alarms had not the least foundation, nor could I attribute them to any other cause, than the evil disposition of the inhabitants of the country.

I conceived that General Châteauneuf Randon, instead of sending me such vague information,—instead of taking those extraordinary measures, which were calculated to create alarm, and to produce the most fatal effects, ought, on the contrary, to have done every thing in his power to encourage the spirits of the people.—Discontented with his conduct, I suspended him from his functions.—But, however painful an avowal of error may be to self-love, I shall not dissemble my acknowledgement, that I acted with too much severity towards that officer ; and that I ought to have seen no fault in his conduct, but an excess of zeal.—I relate this particular circum-

stance, in order to forewarn military men, that they should distrust this kind of tactic, so familiar to the Austrians; which consists in spreading false alarms, to disturb the Commanders, to discourage the soldiers, and to excite commotions among the inhabitants of the country places.

General Bernadotte did all he could to support me: but what succour could he afford? He formed, nevertheless, the blockade of Philippsbourg, took possession of Mannheim, and raised as many works as it was in his power, on several points of the Rhine. He employed himself in furnishing Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein with provisions, as well as in arming and fitting out the conscripts: in short, he earnestly solicited the Directory and the Minister, for the reinforcements, both in cavalry and infantry, which had been so long promised to him: nor is there any occasion to repeat, that his solicitations and earnest entreaties were all in vain.—The troops did not arrive on the Rhine, till we both of us had quitted the command.



I received the 29th, by a courier extraordinary, a dispatch from the Directory, which informed me, that the legislative body had declared the Republic to be in a state of war with Austria and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. On the same day I also received intelligence, that the Archduke had united his Army, and was preparing to attack me. His motions, and the conversation of some of the officers of his light troops, did not leave me the least doubt on that point.—I was not ignorant that his force was twice as strong as that which I commanded, and, which was the worst of all, the whole French Army was as well informed of that circumstance as myself. The inhabitants of the country through which we passed, could not conceive it possible that we should dare to make an attack with such an inferior force.—The hour of delusion was passed, all stratagem was fruitless, and, notwithstanding the utmost address which prudence could suggest, they had discovered our real situation. In such an hazardous position, the safest way would have been to return without fighting; but, imperious as the

motives were which prescribed such a conduct to me, I should never have forgiven myself, if I had yielded to them. In fact, could I abandon General Massena to the whole power of the Austrian Army?—The skill of my enemies in the science of mischief was so complete,—and they had managed every thing with so much address, that whatever part I had taken, they would have found the means to calumniate me. I knew too well the Machiavelian spirit that governed the Directory, to imagine that I should not receive orders to attack. I was sensible that their delay arose from the certainty that I was in such a situation, as to render it impossible for me to fall back without fighting. These very men, who would have exclaimed against me as a coward and a traitor, if I had abandoned General Massena, without having made every effort to support him, have had the affrontery to declare, that I had not received orders to attack. No,—audacious calumniators!—Destroyers of public liberty,—persecutors of the most virtuous and honest citizens;—no, I had not received your orders when I made the attack; but had you

not placed me in a position, where, whatever the hazard might be, I could not refuse to fight without devoting myself to infamy?—To dispel every doubt from the treachery of your designs, I shall transcribe two letters which were written to me by the Minister, who is the organ of your will. It is fortunate for me that your impatience would not allow you to wait the result of the part which I should take.—If you had foreseen it, you would have been cautious enough not to write these letters, and would then have been able to calumniate me with still greater advantage.

*" 29th Ventose, (19th March,) 7th year.*

*" The Minister of War, to Citizen Jourdan, Commander in Chief of the Armies of the Danube,  
" of Observation, and Helvetia.*

*" The Executive Directory, Citizen General,  
" has charged me to send to you, by a courier  
" extraordinary, the details that it has received  
" of the motions of the enemy.*



" If the accounts of these motions are correct,  
 " as there is no reason to doubt, there are good  
 " grounds for concluding that the Austrians have  
 " formed the design to make an attack upon you,  
 " and that they are sensible of their superior  
 " force, since they did not wait for you behind  
 " the Lech; where, by the advantage of their  
 " position, and the facility of uniting their power,  
 " they might hope for success in the first engage-  
 " ment.

" This step of the enemy is taken, probably,  
 " with a view to Switzerland, which is at present  
 " covered by the Army of General Massena, and  
 " where they may expect to find a powerful  
 " party, who will immediately declare them-  
 " selves if they should gain any advantage.

" The Austrians know, besides, that they  
 " have always been beat whenever they have  
 " been attacked; and they may be disposed to  
 " make an attempt that has been so successful  
 " to the French, because it is congenial to their

" character, and is of importance to be renewed  
 " in the beginning of a campaign.

" The Executive Directory, in leaving you,  
 " Citizen General, all the latitude, in point of  
 " execution, that your own force and that of  
 " the Army of Helvetia will allow, has charged  
 " me to inform you of its opinion, that you  
 " should frustrate the projects of the enemy by  
 " attacking them as soon as possible, and before  
 " they have united all their force.

" Great reliance is also had, Citizen General,  
 " on the particular insight you must have into  
 " the situation and circumstances of the enemy  
 " that you have before you; and on your unre-  
 " mitting desire to make the arms of the Repub-  
 " lic triumph.

" Health and Fraternity,

" MILET-MUREAU."

The Directory seemed to be apprehensive that  
 this letter was not sufficiently clear and precise.  
 They had received that of the 28th, in which I

informed them that I was arrived at Pfulendorf, and that, as the Army of Observation could not be formed before the 10th Germinal, (30th March,) I should await that event to commence offensive operations; but that, nevertheless, if, before that period, the Archduke should manifest an intention to attack me or the Army of Helvetia, I was determined to prevent it by attacking him, notwithstanding the superiority of his numbers. The Directory ordered the Minister to write me the following answer.

*" Paris, 2d Germinal, (22d March,) 7th Year  
" of the French Republic, one and indivisible."*

*" The Minister of War to Citizen Jourdan, Com-  
" mander in Chief of the Armies of the Danube,  
" of Helvetia, and of Observation."*

*" The Executive Directory, Citizen General,  
" has read with attention your letter of the  
" 28th Ventose, (18th March,)—and it has  
" charged me to observe to you, that, regard-  
" ing, as they do, the Army of Helvetia to be*



" an integral part of that which you command,  
 " and which you may dispose in any manner  
 " that you shall judge best, it is of importance  
 " that you do not delay an instant in attacking  
 " the enemy, who is daily increasing his force,  
 " while yours remains the same.

" Your army, therefore, being strong, inured  
 " to war, and animated by the success of that  
 " of Helvetia; and the enemy's troops being  
 " discouraged and faint-hearted, the Directory  
 " is persuaded that you ought to be under no  
 " alarm for your left, and to make an immedi-  
 " ate attack.

" The Directory has commanded me to com-  
 " municate to you the motives which influence  
 " its opinion, that you will possess a real advan-  
 " tage in making an instant attack on the ene-  
 " my before its force can be united, and *not-*  
 " *withstanding the non-existence of the Army of Ob-*  
 " *servation.* It refers also, in particular, to the  
 " letter I wrote to you, in its name, on the  
 " 29th Ventose, (19th March,) and relies on

" the daring spirit of your measures, and the  
 " means that you will employ to make the arms  
 " of the Republic triumph.

" Health and Fraternity,

" MILET-MURREAU."

The Directory being compelled to acknowledge that the Army of Observation had a mere nominal existence, speaks with extreme complaisance of that of Helvetia, as if it was, in fact, at my disposal. But, besides that the two armies, separated by the Lake of Constance, could not give the least assistance to each other, but in fighting; such was the position it occupied, and General Massena was threatened by such a superior force, that he frequently solicited me to send him a brigade, commanded by General Ruby, which flanked my right. To give a just idea of the actual position of this Army, I shall transcribe a letter from its commander.

*Head Quarters, at Coire, the 28th Ventosa,  
(18th March,) 7th Year of the French  
Republic, one and indivisible.*

*Massena, Commander in Chief, to Citizen Jourdan,  
Commander in Chief of the Army of the Danube.*

"I received last night, my dear General, a  
"courier-extraordinary from the Executive Di-  
"rectory, by which I am informed, that it has  
"sent you orders to move forwards, as well as  
"to the Commander in Chief of the Army of  
"Italy; and that, on the morning of the 22d,  
"a message was to be sent to the Legislative  
"Body, to recommend it to declare war against  
"the Emperor and the Grand Duke of Tuscany.  
"We are then once more at war, my dear  
"General, and I am obliged to inform you, that  
"I am by no means in a situation to execute  
"the orders that you may send me; not having  
"a single ration of bread to supply the divi-  
"sions;—and if I had it, I am without carriages  
"to transport it."



“ I have unremittingly represented to the  
 “ Minister of war the undisguised situation of  
 “ the Army of Helvetia. On my arrival to take  
 “ the command of it, I gave him an account of  
 “ its total want of waggons, &c.; and that this  
 “ Army being destined to pass over a country  
 “ wholly without resources, it was indispensibly  
 “ necessary to furnish a supply of eight hundred  
 “ thousand rations of biscuit.—They were ac-  
 “ cordingly promised; but nothing is arrived,  
 “ and we are in a state of destitution.

“ I have sent a courier extraordinary to the  
 “ Directory to demand a successor, and I inform  
 “ it, that I am soliciting you, to make a provi-  
 “ sional appointment to my command. I beg of  
 “ you to comply with my request, as I do not  
 “ feel myself able to conduct a war in the Tyrol,  
 “ without subsistence and without carriages.

“ Brigadier General Ruby gives an account  
 “ to his General of Division that General Fe-  
 “ rino has taken a part of it. I have stated  
 “ to you, my dear General, the strength of the

“ Army, and the posts it has to maintain; if,  
 “ therefore, you begin by taking a brigade from  
 “ me, I know not what I shall do.”

It was altogether impossible for me to dispense with attacking the enemy, since he was making his dispositions to anticipate me. It is not less certain that the Archduke had one hundred and twenty thousand men under his command, which were the flower of the Austrian troops. And what had we to oppose to this formidable Army?—Those of the Danube and Helvetia, which, at the commencement of the campaign, did not, in all, amount to sixty-six thousand fighting men.

Being determined to fight, and even to forestall the attack, I communicated my intentions to General Massena, and requested him to do all in his power to get possession of Feldkirch. On the 30th Ventose, (20th March,) I disposed the Army in the following manner. The advanced guard, commanded by General Lefebvre, received orders to take post on a rimulet called

Ostrach, behind the village of that name; and he was charged to keep, with great vigilance, the passes of Mogenbuch. The third division, commanded by General St. Cyr, was ordered to establish itself at Mengen; and was charged to connect itself, by the right, with the troops of the advanced guard; and to detach the left flank companies, commanded by General Vendamme, to the left bank of the Danube, behind the brook which falls into that river below Sigma-

ngen. General Ferino, who commanded the first division, received orders to take his position on the little river Asch, which rises near that of the Ostrach, and empties itself in the Lake of Constance, near Buchorn. He was also charged to occupy the passes of Ravensburg.

The second division, commanded by General Souham, was ordered to encamp, with the cavalry, before Pfulendorf, on the road which leads from that town to Ostrach.



The reserve of cavalry, commanded by General Haupault, were ordered to be cantoned in the environs of Pfulendorf. These two divisions were to form a part of the second line;—they were destined to bear down on the points that should be attacked; or to sustain the other divisions when I should make the attack myself.

The Generals Lefebvre, St. Cyr and Ferino, received orders, to cover the front of their divisions with the light troops; the two first keeping them in advance to the right bank of the Ostrach, and the latter pushing them on to the left bank of the Asch. They were both ordered to make a vigorous attack on the enemy's outposts, of which the light troops were to possess themselves.

General Ferino fell in with the enemy behind Marchdorf, when they were very vigorously attacked by Brigadier General Tharreau, who, at the head of a column of infantry and some light cavalry, turned them, and made fourscore prisoners of the hussar regiment of Grautz, and

seventy foot soldiers of a free corps, among whom was a Major and four other officers. General Ferino ordered the pursuit of the enemy whose loss was very considerable. The number of prisoners made by this division amounted to two hundred men; on our side there were only a few killed and wounded. Citizen Dubalant, Captain of the light infantry carabineers, was among the latter,

General Saint Cyr also fell in with the enemy, and drove them from some villages, situated on the front of his division on the right bank of the Ostrach; killed several men, and made twelve prisoners among whom was a captain. The left flank corps, which I had been obliged to draw off from the Danube, to assure myself if the enemy had really made a movement on that side, as it had been reported, had got to such a distance, as prevented them from reaching the post which had been appointed for them: this circumstance rendered it necessary for General Saint Cyr to detach some troops to the left bank of the Danube, under the orders of

Adjutant General Debilly, to cover his left flank; by which operation he weakened his division. The last observation will, at first, perhaps, appear to be trifling; but those who are profound in the military art will be sensible of its importance, especially, when I have detailed the following particulars.—If the reports of a movement on my left had not been believed; if the extraordinary measures taken at Strasburgh, had not confirmed the certainty of it, I should not have ordered the left flank corps, commanded by General Vendamme, to such a distance from the Army. This corps, which was composed of two demi-brigades and three squadrons, would have formed a junction with the division of General Saint Cyr, who, on the following day, would not only have been in a condition to resist the enemy, but to have given a powerful succour to the advanced guard; and it is not improbable that the Archduke would then have failed in forcing the passage of Ostrach. Thus it is in war, that the most surprising effects proceed sometimes from the most trifling causes. The antients worshipped



Fortune as a divinity.—According to their mythology, she presided over all the events of life, and dispensed good and evil according to her capricious pleasure. Such an idea was more ingenious than philosophic ; better calculated to please the imagination than to satisfy reason on matters that transcend human comprehension. It appears, however, that a kind of fatality oftentimes destroys the wisest plans, renders useless the most sagacious calculations, and conjures up success from measures that experience would regard as errors.—If the most trifling incidents can have such an effect on the fate of battles as cannot be well doubted, Generals, and Commanding Officers, before they make their reports to the Commander in Chief, ought to be well assured of what they advance ; since, from the impossibility of seeing every thing himself, it is from their reports that he must decide ; and one piece of false intelligence, a single alarm, which envy or malevolence may excite, is sometimes capable of disconcerting his projects, and drawing him on into measures, which oftentimes produce the most fatal consequences.

General Lefebvre, who commanded the advanced guard, after having taken the position to which he was appointed, dispatched his light troops to Hoskirch and Saulgen. The right column found the enemy in order of battle before Hoskirch, made a very vigorous attack, and carried the village, which its disadvantageous situation would not suffer them to keep. The Austrians having brought to this point, four battalions, twelve hundred horse, and six pieces of cannon, fought, during the whole day, against four companies of the twenty-fifth demi-brigade of light infantry, a squadron of the first regiment of chasseurs, and one of the fifth of hussars. General Lefebvre afterwards reinforced this corps with a battalion of the fifty-third demi-brigade, of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, and three pieces of light artillery. The night, at length, put an end to this obstinate combat, and the light troops of this column took post, part of them at the head of the village of Koninseck-ralt, and the rest along the wood, which is to the left of Hoskirch, connecting themselves, by posts, across the forest, with those of the left

columns; these, having quitted Ostrach at the same moment, had followed the high road of Saulgen; and having fallen in with the enemy at Bachhaupten, followed them up with great vigour, drove them as far as the abbey of Siefen; and, having scoured the woods of some infantry which were sheltered there, obliged the cavalry to fly, for an opportunity of rallying, to the body of the army which was encamped at Saulgen. At night this column fell back, and took its position behind Bolstern, covering by posts the village of Fridberg, and communicating, by other posts, with the right column.

The advanced guard also caused a considerable loss to the enemy, as well in killed as wounded, and made one hundred and fifty prisoners. Our loss amounted to no more than twenty men wounded and eight killed. The courage displayed by these troops, and the judgment of their intrepid commanders, awakened, in my mind, the most lively satisfaction, and re-animating my hopes. I particularly distinguished among them Citizen Baron, captain in the first



regiment of horse chasseurs; and Citizen Everk, who commanded a squadron in the fifth regiment of the hussars. I did not leave General Lefebvre till an hour before night.

The Army occupied a very advantageous position.—The Ostrach and the Asch are two rivulets whose respective sources are at a small distance from each other, near Riedhausen. The first takes its course from South to North, and empties itself into the Danube, below Mengen. The second, on the contrary, runs from North to South, and empties itself into the Lake of Constance near Buchorn. Though they are very inconsiderable streams, they render the country through which they flow so marshy, that it is not practicable for artillery to pass, but on the great roads which traverse it. There are a greater number of passages for the infantry, but they are very easily defended.

I knew that the Archduke was marching towards me; but I thought it would be two or three days before he would be prepared to make an attack. I was the more confirmed in these conjectures, as, from the reports of the 29th, his

head-quarters were at Mindelheim, and the main body of his army was encamped on the Mindel. I hoped to profit of this interval, either to strengthen the position of the Army, or to attack the corps which was before me ;—and I waited for such intelligence as I might receive the following day, to determine the measure I should prefer. But I was deceived in my calculation: the Archduke advanced by forced marches ; his army had continued its route night and day ; and he anticipated my designs, by attacking me on the 1st Germinal (21st March).

At five in the morning I received a letter from General Lefebvre, who informed me that his advanced posts were attacked at all points ; and that, from the accounts he had received, we must expect a general engagement.

I immediately ordered General Souham, who commanded the second division, to detach a demi-brigade, and a company of light artillery, to reinforce the division of the advanced guard ; and foreseeing if it was the design of the ene-

my to bring on a general engagement, that they would endeavour to turn our position on our right, by penetrating the defiles between the sources of the Ostrach and the Afch; I commanded the same General to detach a body of troops to defend those defiles. He intrusted that operation to Brigadier-General Decaen, who had under him the second demi-brigade of the line, the 1st regiment of dragoons, and two pieces of artillery. This column took the direction of Pfrugen and Waldbeuren.

I ordered General Haupoult to collect the reserved cavalry in the plain of Pfulendorf, to protect, if necessary, the retreat of the advanced guard. The disposition of the country, which was intersected by rivers, marshes, and woods, would not allow me to employ this corps in a more effectual manner, such ground being very unfavourable for the engagement of cavalry.

I wrote to General Saint Cyr, to unite his division and prepare for action. I gave him particular instructions, to spare no exertion in order



to defend a wood which was on his right, and separated his division from that of General Lefebvre, and to prevent the enemy from getting possession of it. He replied to me that he was making the necessary disposition to give a good reception to the Austrians, who were preparing to attack him. He also observed to me, and with reason, that the flank troops to the left, not having been able to reach the position which had been assigned them on the rivulet that empties itself into the Danube, below Sigmaringen, he had been obliged to detach troops to defend that post, as well as another at Sygmardorf, which greatly diminished the strength of his division.

I also communicated to General Ferino the circumstances of the moment; but his headquarters were at Marcdorf, and, consequently, at too great a distance from me to take a very active part in the approaching battle. His division was detached from the army, and formed, in some degree, a distinct corps. He was ordered to act according to circumstances, as it was not

in my power to give him any special instructions.

It may be thought, perhaps, that, considering the small number of my troops, I ought not to have kept this division at so great a distance from the Army, with a view to any operations in the battle of Ostrach. But besides, that it guarded the most important passes, and that it would have been highly imprudent to abandon them, as they led from Ravensbourg to Marckdorf, to Sallmensveiller, and even to Pfulendorf, I had also received the most certain information, that the enemy had a large force on my right. How could I then dispense with keeping a division to observe that corps, to cover my flank, and protect my communications with the Army of Helvetia?

Having issued these different orders, I proceeded to the camp of the advanced guard, accompanied by General Ernouf, who commanded the general staff of the Army as well as my own. On my arrival there about seven o'clock in the

morning, General Lefebvre gave me an exact account of the events which had taken place, and the dispositions that he had made.

The posts beyond Fridberg had been assaulted at one in the morning by a cloud of red cloaks, and had been forced to fall back to the upper part of the wood of Davidseiler.—Six battalions of free corps had attacked, at the same instant, the [night-guards posted behind Bolstern. The twenty-fifth demi-brigade of light infantry, which defended all these passes, had successively retreated to Davidseiller, and afterwards, part to Ostrach, part to Ickofen, and part to Einhart, to defend those three important positions.

This demi-brigade distinguished itself by the signal manner in which it made this retreat, which began at two in the morning, and was not completed till seven.

The first regiment of horse chasseurs, and the fourth of Hussars, formed a part of the column of the twenty-fifth demi-brigade; and in sup-



porting the light infantry, they executed their manœuvres in the best order.

After these movements, the greater part of the twenty-fifth brigade of light infantry had got below the position, and in front of the division of General Lefebvre. Four companies under the orders of the commander of the battalion de Drouin, were placed at the bridge of Ostrach, and at the head of that village, to defend it from the approach of the enemy. Ten other companies, stretching along the left bank of the Ostrach, extended themselves at the same time, on the left, to defend the passes which lead from Vangen and Einbart, to Mogenbuch.

The fourth regiment of hussars, the first of chasseurs, and two squadrons of the seventeenth of dragoons, were placed behind Ostrach, to the right of the position. These troops were commanded by General Klaine.—A battalion of the sixty-seventh demi-brigade was formed into a close column, and placed behind the village of Ostrach, to support the four companies of light

infantry. Another battalion of this demi-brigade was drawn up in order of battle, at the point of the wood which is opposite Jeckafen, in order to defend that village. A battalion of the fifty-third demi-brigade was stationed in reserve near the wood, which lengthened the position. The light artillery and that of the train were placed on several platforms, to defend the approach of the village of Ostrach, by flanking the troops that might approach it.

General Lefebvre reckoned also, for the defence of his position, on a battalion of the fifty-third demi-brigade, four companies of the twenty-fifth demi-brigade of light infantry, three squadrons of the fifth regiment of hussars, a squadron of the first regiment of chasseurs, and two squadrons of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons.

These troops, commanded by Adjutant General Fontaine, had been sent forward in the evening to Hoskirch. He had received orders to fall back on Ostrach: but the enemy had interposed

at the entrance of the village, and he found himself between the fire of the French and that of the Austrians. As he could not attempt the passage without exposing himself to be entirely defeated, he availed himself of a fog, which concealed his column from the enemy, and ascending the Ostrach by the right bank of that river, on which he found no practicable opening, he was forced to advance at far as Riedhausen, where, after having engaged a column of the enemy, he formed his junction with the troops of the second division, which I had dispatched in the morning to defend that pass. This retreat, which was as difficult as it was dangerous, and required an uncommon presence of mind and great courage, does infinite honour to the Adjutant General Fontaine and Citizens Sahuc and Vander-mann, the former, General of the first demi-brigade of chasseurs, and the latter, Commander of the fifty-third demi-brigade. This event, however, weakened the division of General Le-fevre, lessened our means of defence, and contributed to the success of the enemy.



Such were the admirable dispositions made by General Lefebvre when I arrived on the field of battle: and, notwithstanding the immense superiority of the enemy, we might, perhaps, have maintained our positions, if a thick fog had not concealed all their motions, and deprived us of the power to afford any seasonable succour to those points where they directed their attacks.

The enemy attacked the village of Ostrach with three or four battalions in the face of a very brisk cannonade. The four companies of light infantry placed in this village, and protected by a terrible fire of our artillery, sustained the shock with an heroic courage, and continued to repulse the Austrians during three hours. The Commander of the battalion, Drouin, covered himself with glory in this action.

At the same time the enemy filed off several battalions, with artillery, to their right. They then made a vigorous attack on the village of Schopen, with a view to penetrate to Mogen-

buch, by different fords that the little rivulet of Ostrach offers in this part of it.

General Lefebvre, who perceived this movement, immediately dispatched the battalion of the fifty-third demi-brigade, which had been kept in reserve, behind Vangen, and ordered his cavalry to pass, from the right of his position to the left, to support the infantry who defended the passage of the rivulet.

The firing was terrible and continual; and the enemy, who considered it of the utmost importance to get possession of Ostrach, sent fresh troops to reinforce the former, and at length, so far prevailed, as to compel the four companies who defended it, to abandon the bridge, and to fall back into the village. The Brigadier-General Bontems, who was behind this village with the battalion of the sixty-seventh demi-brigade, received orders at the same instant, to retake the post and keep it. He immediately gave the signal of attack, and executed the order with a steady courage which is above all praise.

General Lefebvre being informed that the enemy made every effort to get possession of the passes which led to Mogenbuch, hastened to Ikofen to satisfy himself that the dispositions had been made, which he had commanded. As he was directing some movement, he was struck by a bullet on his left arm ; and he strove, as long as possible, to conceal his wound from the officers that surrounded him: when he was, at length, obliged to quit the field of battle, I gave the command of his division to Brigadier-General Soult.

At this moment the seventh demi-brigade, which formed a part of the second division, arrived to support the advanced guard, in conformity to the order I had given to General Souham before my departure from Pfulendorf. A battalion of this demi-brigade was placed behind the village of Ostrach ; and I ordered Adjutant-General Molitor to conduct the other battalion to Mogenbuch, in order that he might be in a situation to press forward to the passes which were the most vigorously attacked, and



support the troops that defended them : but this battalion arrived too late. General Molitor fell in with these troops, who, compelled to give way to superior numbers on the side of Vangen and Einhart, were retreating to the division of the advanced guard. He wished to renew the attack ; but the enemy were already scattered through the woods and in great force ; on the other hand, our troops were harassed and exhausted with fatigues, as well as in want of ammunition. The enemy took this advantage to press our artillery with some corps of cavalry ; but they were repulsed by two squadrons commanded by General Klaine. The Brigadier-Generals Merlin, Saint Dizier, and the General of Horse Dubois Crancé, led on their troops with great intrepidity and judgment.

At this time, the fog being dispersed, we discovered an immense line of cavalry and infantry. It may be said, without exaggeration, that the troops which engaged our advanced guard amounted to twenty-five thousand men. I now perceived the absolute impossibility of making

any further resistance against such a superior force, as well as the danger that threatened the division, from the advantage which the enemy had gained on the left. I therefore ordered General Soult, to fall back with the division to the post before Pfulendorf.

The retreat was effected in perfect order, and was supported in particular by the seventh company of sap-men, who, after having cut down, under the enemy's fire, the bridges on the Ostrach, fought like grenadiers. Citizen Crété, Lieutenant of that company, distinguished himself in a manner that deserves my eulogium. The Brigadier-Generals Soult and Laval performed prodigies of valour. The former displayed, in the command of the division which he had taken, after General Lefebvre was wounded, a presence of mind and military talent that were truly admirable. The Citizens Bontems, Brigadier-General, and Chauffard, who commanded the battalion of the sixty-seventh demi-brigade of infantry, conducted themselves in a manner to merit the utmost praise. Our

artillery did great execution among the enemy's troops: the cannoneers and officers equally distinguished themselves, the one by their activity and address, and the other by their judicious directions. The staff officers employed near General Lefebvre were eminently serviceable; at one time, in braving every danger to discover the motions of the enemy which the fog concealed from us; and, at other times, by directing, with superior skill, the several columns to those points, where the General wished them to act: in short, in this memorable conflict, French valour appeared in all its lustre. Officers and soldiers fought with intrepidity, against enemies, who were formidable from their superior force: they flattered themselves that they should crush by prodigies of courage, an enemy who might overwhelm them by the weight of numbers. Those thick battalions which they saw extend before them, far from checking their ardour, appeared to redouble it. That day, so celebrated for heroism, will dwell for ever on my remembrance. It will recall those precious testimonies of affection, that can never be effaced from my memory;



and will not cease to console me in the midst of that bitter cup which my implacable enemies have given me to drink. I shall ask permission to mention one circumstance, among an hundred others, which will prove that, at all times, I have known how to deserve the esteem of the soldier. In retracing this little event, I do not mean to make an offering to my own self-love; but to give a free course to the sensibility of my heart.

Some time after General Lefebvre had received his wound, a bullet struck my horse, and I was thrown on the field of battle; a sudden exclamation of, "The General is killed," instantly escaped, with the most mournful accents, from the soldiers which were about me. I arose, and mounted another horse, and joy beamed on every countenance. Brave and affectionate Comrades! receive the expression of my most lively gratitude; how dear is the testimony of your attachment to me! I shall never forget your kind reproaches, when I exposed myself to dangers in fighting by your side.—Ought not I then to partake your perils, since I share in your glory? What! shall

I see so many intrepid warriors encounter death a thousand times,—and shelter myself from its stroke?—No : my duty did not instruct me alone to direct your ardent courage ; it commanded me also to display my own.—The more affectionately you regarded me, the more I cherished you ; and I ought to render myself the more worthy of you, by my zeal, my courage, and my devotion to you.

At the same time that the enemy attacked the division of General Lefebvre with so much fury, they were proceeding to make a similar attack on the front of the division of General Saint Cyr, and it took place immediately after that of General Lefebvre. Towards six in the morning the engagement became serious. The enemy assailed with great spirit the troops that General Saint Cyr had placed on the right bank of the Ostrach, in the villages of Hohendeng, Felckosen, Reiskaen, and Urfendorf, to cover the front of his division ; which, from the superiority of the force employed against them, were obliged to fall back on the main body of it.

The enemy had a corps at Herbentingen, which consisted of a thousand or twelve hundred horse, two battalions, and some pieces of artillery; which was supported by a battalion and some squadrons that were at Reidlingen.

General Saint Cyr ordered Adjutant-General Debilly to proceed with two squadrons to the left bank of the Danube, in sight of Riedlingen. The object of this movement was to alarm the enemy on this point, and give it the appearance of being the advanced guard of our corps of flank regiments, which meditated an attack on Riedlingen.

A battalion of the hundredth and eighth demi-brigade, which occupied Sigmaringen, Sigmaringendorf, and Scheer, supported at the same time the left of the Army of the Danube, and secured the retreat of Adjutant-General Debilly. The second battalion of this demi-brigade, three pieces or light artillery, and three squadrons of the second regiment of dragoons, formed the brigade of General Walter. This corps was



posted before Mongen, on the high road of Ulm, to defend that pass, and to observe the corps of troops at Herbentingen.

The movement of Adjutant-General Debilly produced the effect that General Saint Cyr expected from it. The enemy did not venture to dismantle Riedlingen, and the corps of Herbentingen did not move. General Saint Cyr, to whom I had communicated every thing that passed before Ostrach, and whom I had ordered to move his forces as much as possible to the right, in order to support General Lefebvre in preventing the enemy from penetrating between the two divisions, put the brigade of General Legrand in motion, and it soon drove the Austrians from the villages which our troops had been forced to evacuate a few hours before. Anxious to avail himself of this advantage, he was preparing to march to Fridberg, in order to attack the flank, and, if possible, to turn the corps which was in front of the division of General Lefebvre, when he learned that this division had

been compelled to abandon the position of Ostrach, and to retreat to Pfulendorf.

This news was confirmed to him by one of my aids-de-camp, who pointed out the necessity of making such dispositions as to prevent his being hemmed in on his right; and, at the same time, delivered him orders to retire behind the river which, passing Moersckirch, flows into the Danube below Scheer.

The enemy, seizing the advantage produced by the retreat of the division of General Lefebvre, brought up numerous reinforcements to the right of General Saint Cyr. Our troops were now repulsed a second time from the villages situated on the right bank of the Ostrach, and the General collected his division on the left bank of that rivulet. The Austrians prepared to force the passage of Ostrach, but the preparations made to charge them on their first movement, and the firm aspect of our troops, induced them to abandon their design. They then proceeded to their left, and passed the rivulet of

Ostrach by the openings of which they had possessed themselves, and appeared to meditate an attempt to turn the whole division of General Saint Cyr, and to cut off his retreat to Moerkirch. That General ordered the brigade of General Légrand to follow up this movement, and at the same time sent a detachment to the right, to support the brigade of General Walter.

Nevertheless, the enemy continued to advance on the right of General Saint Cyr, and began to penetrate to his rear, by the village of Fulpingen, on the high road of Moerkirch; when the General detached Adjutant-General Saligny with a battalion of the fiftieth demi-brigade, and ordered him to make a rapid movement to that point, and to drive the enemy from it. That officer executed this operation with great activity and judgment, and thereby secured the retreat of the division; which was effected, in excellent order, at the approach of night.

When General Saint Cyr rendered me an account of the events of this day, he bestowed



great praise on the troops of his division; and added, that the eighth regiment of chasseurs, and the fifth demi-brigade, were the corps which more particularly distinguished themselves. He also made honourable mention of the talents and courage of Brigadier-General Legrand; but he only confirmed me in the favourable opinion with which the skill, the prowess, and the modesty of that officer had inspired me, when he served in the Army of the Sambre and the Meuse.

During the action of Ostrach, I detached General Erneuf to the post of Pfulendorf, to dispose the reserved cavalry in the plain which is before that town, and to place the artillery on various platforms, in order to protect the retreat of the division of the advanced guard. After having given orders to that effect to General Haupolt, he proceeded to Riedhausen, in order to inform himself of what was passing on my right, on the side of Prurgen and Valdenburen. Here he found General Souham, who, sensible of the importance of this pass, by which the Army

might be entirely turned, had proceeded thither and joined the column of General Decaen, who had been stationed there ever since the morning.

General Decaen, on approaching Prurgen, had detached a part of his troops to the defile of Effenhäusen; where he formed a junction with that part of the advanced guard, which had not been able to make good its retreat to Ostrach, and which it now protected. This corps resisted, here, as well as at Valdenbeuren, a column of the enemy, which attempted in vain to obtain a passage there. It retreated, in the evening, to the camp of Pfulendorf.

I did not, at this time, know if General Ferino had been attacked; but having been forced to abandon the Ostrach, I did not think it proper to leave this division on the Aisch, where it might be turned by its left and driven, even, into the Lake of Constance. I accordingly informed General Ferino of what had passed on the Ostrach, and ordered him to retreat to Salsmenggiller, that he might be on a line with the rest of

the Army. Though this General was faced by a very considerable force he had not been attacked; the enemy had only made some movements of no consequence, with a view, probably, to amuse and engage him to remain in his position, in order to fight him on the following day with more advantage, by attacking his front and flank. This conjecture seems to be justified by the conduct of the Archduke, who, after having made the body of his Army pass the Aisch and the Ostrach at their sources, encamped at a few leagues to the right of Pfulendorf.

The loss of the enemy, during the course of this day, was very considerable: it amounted, according to the accounts of prisoners and deserters, to upwards of four thousand men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. The whole of ours did not exceed from fourteen to fifteen hundred: the greatest part of them were wounded, and were immediately transported to the left bank of the Rhine. We lost also one cannon, which being dismounted could not be carried off.



Such was the actual result of this memorable day; and, when the superiority of the enemy's forces is considered, it will be regarded as equal in point of honour to the most brilliant victories. It cannot but add to the high idea, which the Imperial troops already entertained of our prowess. The republicans were so sensible of the superiority of their courage and intrepidity, they were so convinced that they had performed every thing in this engagement of which the most admired heroism was capable, that, far from feeling the slightest discouragement, they congratulated themselves on their late efforts, as if they had obtained a brilliant triumph.

What then is that incomprehensible fatality which renders so many sublime virtues useless; and by what dreadful combinations does it happen, that the people, who have given such grand examples of Republicanism, and the most astonishing proofs of the love of independence, should fall again beneath the vilest yoke? No,—that shall never be, I swear by the manes of so many heroes, cut down in the field of glory, who

in every republican that lives, will find an avenger.—Traitors, Tyrants, Royal Slaves! exhaust the infamous resources of your evil genius; invent new crimes; increase the number of your atrocious deeds; and shed, in copious streams, the purest blood; but others will rise up to rival and imitate those generous and valiant men, whom you have immolated.—Yes, I repeat it,—the death of our heroes shall be avenged, and the French, instead of cringing to a master, shall yet make the pretended masters of the world tremble!

The enemy, harassed by forced marches, and checked by the stern courage of the French Army, pursued our divisions with so little activity, that our movement was executed in the greatest order, and without suffering any loss.

As I had not been able to withstand the enemy in the position of Ostrach, I did not think it prudent to remain in that of Pfulendorf, which was not to be compared with the former; and where the Austrians might have attacked me

with the greatest advantage. I determined therefore to retreat, in order to take a more contracted position. Accordingly the Army was in motion at two in the morning of the 2d Germinal, (22d March,) and took its situation between the Danube and the Lake of Constance; the right protected by that Lake near Bodman, the centre at Stockach, and the left by the river, near Fridingen. The movement was performed in good order, and the enemy did not follow the columns; a few light troops alone presented themselves in the evening before our advanced posts. I fixed my head-quarters at Stockach.

Though this position was the least extended of any I could find between the Lake of Constance and the Danube, it appeared to me, from the nature of the ground, to afford the enemy very great advantage in attacking us. After having examined it myself with the utmost attention, I determined to abandon it. The Army, therefore, renewed its march on the 3d, at four in the morning, and took the position which I shall now describe.



The first division was encamped near Hohen-  
 tweil; the second, the advanced guard, and the  
 division of cavalry, were encamped on the height  
 of Engen. The third division was encamped on  
 the heights of Futingen, behind the villages of  
 Newhausen and Liebtengen \*. The flank regi-  
 ments, which had rejoined the Army, were on  
 the left bank of the Danube, in the environs of  
 Fridengen. I fixed the head-quarters at Engen.

The 4th. The Army remained in its position.  
 On the same day the Archduke encamped at  
 Stockach; and his reconnoitring parties, which  
 were supported by considerable bodies of troops,  
 approached so near us, that an engagement soon  
 took place along the whole front of our line.

General Ferino, who commanded the division  
 on the right, made a vigorous resistance to the

---

\* There is an error on all the maps, which I shall mention  
 to the reader, in order that he may follow with more correct  
 intelligence the military operations which he is about to  
 read. The villages of Newhausen and Liebtengen occupy  
 the places of each other on the charts.

attack of the enemy. Nevertheless, at the same time that he made his advanced posts fall back, he ordered a brigade to advance to their support; so that the Austrians, giving themselves up to the pursuit of our troops, were repulsed by this brigade, with the loss of two hundred prisoners, and a great number of killed and wounded. The action continued till night, and the division maintained its position. The enemy attempted to surprize the eighty-third demi-brigade, which was a part of the second division, commanded by General Souham, that occupied a wood opposite to Engen, to cover that town, and the front of this division; but the resolute appearance of this demi-brigade, and the vigilance of its officers, disconcerted the Austrians. General Souham made some movements in his division to support the eighty-third demi-brigade, and to prevent the enemy from turning the position which he occupied. At length he drove them back to the village of Asch, with the loss of one hundred and sixty prisoners, and a great number of killed and wounded.

The loss of the second and third division, in the course of this day, amounted to two hundred men. The action wore a more serious aspect on the left. The position occupied by the third division, which was commanded by General Saint Cyr, was such as naturally to fix the attention of the enemy. He could not, without being exposed to an attack on the flank, advance to Engen. That attempt had already proved unsuccessful, before this division had been forced to retreat to the left bank of the Danube.

General Saint Cyr had at first defended the opening from Stockach to Liebtingen as long as he could. He afterwards defended the village of Liebtingen by a battalion of the first demi-brigade of infantry, supported by the light artillery stationed on the two rivers of the village. But the number of the enemy being continually increasing, it was impossible to keep the village, and the troops were forced to retire to the upper part of a wood which crowns the heights before Tuttlingen. The enemy attacked this wood, and, for a short time, made a most



alarming progress; but were soon stopped by the fiftieth demi-brigade, which was kept in reserve. General Saint Cyr being desirous of dividing the attention of the enemy, ordered a false attack by some left flank companies, who hastened to the heights of Buchenberg. At the same time he ordered the eighth demi-brigade, commanded by General Compere, to advance. These two movements, which were made with precision, the one on the right of the enemy, the other in front, and supported by a third attack made on his left, by a battalion of the fiftieth demi-brigade, commanded by General Legrand, were crowned with success. The enemy was driven, with great loss, from every part of the wood, and could not re-enter it, though they made several different attacks during the day to effect that object.

General Saint Cyr, in the account which he gave me of this action, which does the greatest honour to the courage of the troops and the talents of the commander, estimates the loss of the enemy at twelve hundred men. Four hundred

brave men of this division were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. General Compere, who gave proofs of uncommon judgment, and the most daring intrepidity, was severely wounded. General Legrand surpassed himself, and his aid-de-camp and his brother were killed by his side.

During this action I remained at the camp, which was situated on the heights behind Engen, where I examined the motions of the enemy, and from whence I dispatched officers to all points. From the reports which were made to me by them and the prisoners, I was soon convinced that this attack was merely for the purpose of reconnoitring; and that the Archduke would march down upon me on the following day. I could have avoided his attack by retreating in the night; I thought, however, that it would be better, more honourable, as well as more conformable to the intentions of the Directory, to prevent his design; I determined, therefore, to attack him. I formed this resolution with the greater confidence, as I hoped

to beat the corps which had fought the third division; and that advantage, I trusted, would be followed by the retreat of the Austrian army. Besides, that which I commanded could not be defeated, as each division had a secure retreat, either on the left bank of the Danube, or in the Black Mountains; which might be very easily effected, as the country, being very much intersected by hollow ways, woods, and mountains, a retreating army might, at every instant, impede the march of that which pursued it, more particularly as the latter could make but little use of cavalry. If I should be repulsed, I could continue my retreat without danger; and, if I conquered, I should attach victory to the standards of the Republic for the rest of the campaign.

Another not less powerful motive was the intelligence which I had received from General Massena, in a letter of the 1st Germinal, (21st March,) in answer to mine of the 29th of the preceeding month, in which I earnestly recommended him to attack Feldkirch. As that General informed me that he should make the



proposed attack on the 4th, I was resolved not to be accused at least of having abandoned him to his own strength, before I had done every thing in the reach of my faculties, to second him.

Such being my determination, I made my dispositions conformably to it. General Ferino, who commanded the right division received orders to proceed to Stockach, by way of Steislingen. General Souham, who commanded the second division, was ordered also to Stockach by the route of Engen; and the former of these officers was to take the command of the two divisions when they had formed a junction.

General Soult, who commanded the advanced guard, was charged to direct his march to Emingen, and from thence to Liebtengen.

General Haupoult, who commanded the reserve of cavalry, received orders to follow the division of the advanced guard.

General Saint Cyr, who commanded the third division, was charged to unite under him the left flank regiments, commanded by General Vendamme, and passing by Tuttlingen, Mechlen, and Fridengen, to direct his course to Liebtingen.—This movement would be protected by that of the advanced guard.

This order was delivered in the evening of the 4th to all the Generals of Division, and the Army was put in motion at four in the morning. I marched with the advanced guard, accompanied by the Generals Ernouf and Lamantilliere, and all my staff.

The advanced guard, found the advanced posts of the enemy at Emingen. The principal body of Austrians was placed before Liebtingen, and its front covered by the village of Emingen, as well as by a wood, part of which was marshy, which lengthened the front of the position. This wood was defended by three thousand infantry supported by twelve pieces of artillery.

General Soult ordered Emingen to be attacked by the twenty-fifth demi-brigade of light infantry, while the Brigadier General Sahuc, of the first regiment of Chasseurs marched to the right with three Squadrons, and charged with uncommon intrepidity four hundred Hulans, who protected the infantry that defended the village. The Hulans were soon routed and forced to fly with the loss of several men killed, a great many wounded, and thirty prisoners with their horses. Citizen Sahuc received, during the action, a wound in the face from the stroke of a lance. Attacked by at least twenty of the enemy, he at length dispersed them all by his superior courage. He was, however, obliged to retire with Adjutant Graché, who had received a severe wound on his head. General Dubois Crancé then took the command of the first regiment of chasseurs.

As soon as the village was carried, the whole division passed on, and General Soult made his dispositions to attack the wood. General Mortier proceeded, at the head of the twenty-fifth



demi-brigade of light infantry, to the right of the wood, in order to turn the left of the enemy. He accordingly made his attack with such impetuosity, that he soon penetrated to Liebtingen.

The fifty-third and the sixty-seventh demi-brigades, conducted by General Leval, marched on the right and left of Liebtingen. On their arrival there the infantry was obliged to halt for the cavalry and artillery, which had not yet been able to get clear of the wood. This movement was made with the greatest rapidity, and the enemy's line being broken, it was put to the rout, and sought for safety in flight, by penetrating the woods which lay between Liebtingen and Stockach.

While the advanced guard fought with such spirit and success, it was powerfully seconded by the division of General Saint Cyr, and the left flank regiments. This General had collected, under the command of General Walter, the brigade of General Walter, with the flank corps. General Vendamme was to proceed with his

troops by Michlen and Fridningen, at the same time that General Legrand, at the head of the eighth and fiftieth demi-brigade, and the eighth and tenth regiment of Chasseurs, was to make his way to Liebtingen, by the high road of Tuttlingen to Stockach. The column of General Walter experienced great difficulties in passing by Mechlen, and his artillery was suddenly dismounted by that of the enemy; but General Vendamme, in passing by Frinlingen, with the first demi-brigade of light infantry and some squadrons, turned the enemy and protected the movement of General Walter. The dragoons of the second regiment made an admirable charge on the Austrian Cuirassiers and Hulans: and General Vendamme, bravely seconded by the Brigadier-Generals Jardon and Walter, clung, as it were, to the flank of the enemy, and having completely routed them, continued the pursuit to the woods which are between Liebtingen and Stockach.

The brigade of General Legrand could not move forwards till the enemy had been forced to

retreat by the division of the advanced guard and the corps of General Vendamme.

The corps which the Archduke had brought to the environs of Liebtingen, and which, without exaggeration, amounted from twenty to twenty-five thousand men, sustained an entire defeat, and was forced to fly into the woods, leaving in our possession three thousand prisoners and two pieces of cannon.

Prefuming that the Archduke, sensibly affected as he must have been by this defeat, and pressed by the first and second divisions, which I supposed to have arrived near Stockach, would have determined to retreat, I ordered General Soult to penetrate into the woods of Stockach with his division, and to pursue with the utmost vigour the routed enemy. I left the reserved cavalry in the plains of Liebtingen, and ordered General Saint Cyr to hasten to Moerkirch, with the view of turning the enemy's army, so as to fall upon it at the moment when it should retreat to Pfulendorf. This movement



will appear very daring, if not rash, to military men; but I request them to reflect on the situation in which I found myself. The Austrian force was twice as numerous as mine; and my late success was not sufficient to establish an equal balance between the two armies: and even if the enemy should have retreated, he might have retired tranquilly to Pfulendorf, or behind Ostrach, where I certainly should not have been in a condition to attack him. Instead of which, by means of this movement to Moerskirch, which was calculated to force his retreat, I flattered myself that General Saint Cyr would fall upon his equipage and the flank of his army, which I should have vigorously attacked in the rear, with the main body of my troops. Then, I trust that the enemy would have been completely routed, and a great part of his army taken off, which would have secured success to the French arms during the whole of the campaign.

General Soult immediately ordered a battalion of the twenty-fifth demi-brigade and the first regiment of chasseurs to follow the enemy. This

corps pursued the fugitives to the middle of the wood ; but he there fell in with a column that stopped his progress, and renewed the engagement, which the late discomfiture had only suspended.

It appeared, from all the reports, that the Archduke Charles, at the head of a column of eight battalions of Hungarian grenadiers, of an equal number of other battalions, and six thousand horse, with a numerous train of artillery, was on his march to Liebtingen ; and that he was already before Molsperen, when he was informed of the retreat of a part of his army. He accordingly gave orders that the fugitives should be rallied in his rear, and advanced with the troops that he conducted into the forest to attack us.

The twenty-fifth demi-brigade, which was unacquainted with this movement of the Archduke, was pushing on towards the enemy with great ardour, supposing that they were the troops which had already been beaten ; when it was

stopped by the appearance of twelve or fifteen thousand infantry, arranged in several lines. General Soult immediately sent a battalion of the fifty-third demi-brigade, and shortly after one of the sixty-seventh to its support. The two other battalions of these same demi-brigades, anxious to share in the glory and dangers of their comrades, requested to join them; and with the design to put an end to a long and destructive fire, these three demi-brigades advanced with an heroic intrepidity to the charge, and pierced the first line of the enemy; but they were stopped by a second line of several fresh battalions, and were obliged to rally, with some companies which had been left in reserve, near the artillery.

The enemy took advantage of this movement to attempt an attack upon our wings, but some detached companies prevented it, and General Soult commanded another assault. The charge was now beat along the whole line. General Leval, at the head of the fifty-third and sixty-seventh demi-brigades, and General Mortier, who com-



manded the twenty-fifth, made very powerful, but fruitless efforts on this occasion. The enemy had concentrated his forces on this point, and fresh reinforcements were continually arriving from Stockach.

Notwithstanding the superior numbers which the Austrians opposed to us, the French republicans, as well officers as soldiers, were inspired with the ardor of victory; and, encouraging each other, were eager to make another effort to obtain it. The order to charge was repeated for the third time, and was obeyed with the same intrepidity as had been already displayed, but with the same ill fortune. The enemy recovered from his first shock, contracted his centre; at the same time ordering his wings to advance, with a design to surround this handful of heroes who persisted in disputing the victory with so much fury. Perceiving that it was impossible to prevent the effect of this manœuvre, especially with troops exhausted by fatigue, and the greater part of whose arms were become unserviceable; nothing remained but to preserve

them from the imminent danger which threatened them. I, therefore, ordered General Soult to draw his troops from the wood, and to join the reserve cavalry, which remained in the plain before Liebtingen.

During the action, sustained with so much glory and courage by the infantry of the advanced guard, I detached several officers to General Saint Cyr to desire him to hasten his march to Moerskirch, that he might push forwards a body of troops by the woods on the rear of the enemy. I also ordered him to send me to Newhausen a demi-brigade of infantry.

The division of the advanced guard performed its retrograde movement in the best possible order. The infantry was posted in the woods which are on each side the plain of Liebtingen: the cavalry was drawn up in the plain, which was about eight hundred yards in breadth; and the artillery was so disposed as to bear upon whatever proceeded from the wood which we had just quitted.

I detached General Klaine, with two regiments of cavalry, to Emingen, in order to observe the passes by which the enemy might come upon our rear, without being perceived from the position which I had taken.

In this position, I entertained the hope of hindering the enemy from getting out of the wood, and, thereby, maintaining my communications with General Saint Cyr, to the very moment when his attack should produce the effect that I expected from it: but I was disappointed in this expectation; for, in spite of the brisk and destructive fire of our artillery and infantry, the enemy's cavalry, supported by a numerous body of infantry, came out of the wood by a defile, and posted itself with some pieces of artillery in front of the wood, with a ravine behind it.

At this moment, it was announced to me, that, the eighth demi-brigade, which I had required of General Saint Cyr, was arrived at the left of the position. I was now determined to employ all the means I had in my power, and ordered a general attack.



The eighth demi-brigade received orders to penetrate the ravine which turned the flat piece of ground on which the enemy's cavalry was stationed. General Laval, who was with the sixty-seventh at the head of the wood, to the left of the plain, was to charge the infantry as it came forth, and to drive it on the eighth demi-brigade, who would have taken off a great part of it. The fifty-third and twenty-fifth demi-brigades, who were in the wood to the right of the plain, were also to charge the infantry as they issued forth before them. The movement of the infantry, except that of the eighth demi-brigade, was not to be executed till after the charge of the cavalry.

I ordered General Haupoult, who commanded the reserve of the cavalry, to charge the enemy's cavalry. This reserve was composed only of two regiments of carabineers, of the sixth regiment of cavalry, and of another whose number I do not recollect. There were, besides, in the plain, the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, and the fourth and fifth regiments of hussars, which

formed a part of the division of the advanced guard. Unfortunately this charge did not produce the effect that I had expected from it. In the first place, it was not executed at the moment, when I gave the order, which afforded the enemy time to augment its forces: on the other hand, it was not made with the regularity and compactness which are so necessary in such manœuvres. Our cavalry being repulsed, retreated in disorder; and if that of the enemy had not been stopped by the fire of the infantry and the artillery placed at the head of the woods which are on the right and the left of the plain, the Army would have sustained a very heavy loss. In this state of things, I did not hesitate to rush into the midst of the carabineers, holding up my hat, with its plume of feathers, in my hand, as a rallying point, ordering them to stop and collect themselves around me; but not being able to make myself heard, I was forced onwards in the confusion, and beat about on all sides. But I am far from attributing to cowardice the conduct of the cavalry. These brave troops, gave instant proof that they were as courageous as

the infantry, by the manner in which they sustained their retreat under a terrible fire of the enemy, and a continual discharge of grape-shot. I imputed it entirely to the little experience we have in manœuvring large masses of cavalry.

The eighth demi-brigade, according to the orders which it had received, began to turn the position of the enemy; when the latter, availing itself of the advantage that the charge of the cavalry gave it, poured down four or five thousand infantry on the demi-brigade, which did not consist of more than twelve hundred men.

The chief of the battalion, Marion, who commanded it, gave an example of courage and intrepidity to the brave men under him; but he received a shot, and fell into the power of the enemy: from that moment the demi-brigade began to give way, and retreated towards Neuhausen, and afterwards joined the division of General Soult.



There was a very heavy cannonade on both sides till the approach of night, which terminated the most obstinate conflict I had ever seen. The division of the advanced guard and that of the cavalry posted themselves at the head of the wood, which is situated on the heights before Tuttlingen, and behind Liebtingen. Our troops occupied the latter village.

General Saint Cyr had sent General Vendamme to attack the rear of the enemy, at the head of the first demi-brigade of light infantry, and six squadrons with three pieces of artillery. At first, this General obtained some advantage, but the enemy having opposed him with a very considerable force, he was obliged to retreat.

As soon as I perceived that, in spite of the reiterated efforts of the division of the advanced guard, it was not possible for me to prevent the enemy from getting out of the woods of Stockach, and gaining Neuhausen, it became indispensable that General Saint Cyr should retreat, who, from his situation, would, without this precaution,

have been totally furrounded. I therefore expedited several officers, who, after having risked falling into the hands of the enemy, at length joined him. They informed him of all that happened before Liebtingen, and gave him my orders to retreat to the left bank of the Danube, after having passed that river at Sigmaringen.—He accordingly executed that movement in the night of the 5th, in good order and without any loss.

General Souham, who commanded the second division, put it in motion at four in the morning, conformably to the order which he had received. He first proceeded to Asch, to possess himself of that post, and then advanced to Stockach. He began by attacking the enemy with his right brigade under General Decaen, which was composed of the second and seventh demi-brigades of the line, and the first regiment of dragoons. This attack was made with the bayonet fixed, and, after a very sharp contest, they possessed themselves of the heights of the village of Asch;

but the enemy having turned the position, and come down in force on our troops, they were obliged to fall back to the opening of the wood behind Asch. At ten o'clock General Souham, perceiving that the divisions to the right and left had gained some advantage, gave orders to renew the attack. His whole division then moved forwards with uncommon intrepidity, and drove the enemy beyond Aigeltingen, where he took post; the right brigade in the front of the village, and the left brigade behind it. This division caused no small loss to the enemy in killed and wounded, and made nine hundred prisoners.

In the account which General Souham gave me of this action, he bestowed those praises on the officers and soldiers which they so well deserved. He added, that Citizen Coste, chief of battalion of the eighty-third demi-brigade, and Citizen Cohorn, chief of battalion and aid-de-camp to General Decaen, particularly distinguished themselves in this action.



General Ferino, who commanded the first division, also put himself in motion at four in the morning. General Tharreau, who commanded the right brigade of this division, made a vigorous attack on the enemy, whom he drove back as far as Steißlingen, and forced that village, by turning them on their two flanks. General Jacopin, who commanded the left brigade of this division, made also a powerful attack on the enemy whom he found in the marshes, which are to the left of Steißlingen. The enemy being forced to retire into a wood, near a village which is beyond the marsh, to the left of Steißlingen, was charged with great courage, repulsed with considerable loss in killed and wounded, and left General Ferino in possession of five hundred prisoners.

General Tharreau, continuing to repulse the enemy, marched, by the causeway of Stockach, to Orsingen. The Imperialists collected their force behind this village, and opposed itself to the whole division of General Ferino, which occupied the flat ground in their front ; as well as

that of General Souham, which endeavoured to obtain a passage by Aigeltingen.

General Ferino engaged, at first, in a brisk cannonade with the enemy; but as that was not effectual in compelling them to retreat, he made an attack on the woods which cover the road from Stockach to Aſch,

It was a terrible and bloody conflict on both sides. Twice the attack was renewed with fresh troops, without being able to carry the wood. At length, a third column overthrew the enemy, and pursuing them to beyond Lentzingen, got possession, at the same time, of the heights which command that village. The Austrians then made a precipitate retreat, and, forming a horse-shoe, took post behind and to the right of Stockach, when they erected a battery of twenty cannon in its front, whose fire General Ferino could not return from a want of ammunition.

It is very unfortunate that General Souham did not follow the movement of General Ferino,

and march his division at the same time to Lentzingen; because the enemy, being thus menaced at Stockach by two divisions, would not have been able to have brought so many troops against General Saint Cyr and the advanced guard.

Recovered from its alarm, and perceiving that the division of General Ferino was not in a condition to attack them in that position, the Austrians began to act on the offensive, and marched off to Walvis, with the view to turn the French division on its right. General Ferino therefore detached General Jacopin with his brigade, who attacked the enemy, with bayonets fixed, in the village of Walvis, and carried it: but the Austrians, having collected a considerable force behind Walvis General Ferino thought it best, when night came on, to evacuate it.

Such is the result of this battle, which, whatever may be said to the contrary, by my base detractors, was, in reality, gained by the French Army.



In fact, if it is considered that this intrepid army consisting of no more than about thirty-four thousand men, attacked the Austrian Army of near eighty thousand, and repulsed them on all sides, with a loss, according to their own accounts, of seven thousand men killed and wounded; that we took four thousand prisoners and two pieces of cannon; that we forced them to abandon their principal position near Stockach, and remained on the field of battle where our troops displayed so much valour; and which is still more, that our army passed the whole day of the sixth there, though they had neither meat, nor bread, nor brandy, nor forage; it is impossible to deny, without the most glaring injustice and falsehood, that we gained the victory.

Our loss, on this memorable occasion, was about three thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing. Among the first were the Citizens Grele and Viard, Chiefs of Squadrons in the fifth regiment of Hussars. These two officers, equally estimable for their talents as their courage, had the esteem as they are remembered

with regret, by all who commanded or obeyed them. The republican troops conducted themselves throughout with an heroic bravery. The officers of all ranks, generally, manifested the greatest valour. It is very much to be regretted, that, notwithstanding the union of such efforts, and such zeal, we were prevented, by the immense superiority of the enemy, from rendering our success more complete : and I dare affirm, nor do I fear the contradiction of any of my brave companions in arms, that with the addition of ten thousand, I should have entirely defeated the army of Prince Charles ; and that General Saint Cyr would have possessed himself of all his equipage and park of artillery. It would then have been very practicable for me to have proceeded to Bregentz, to favour the march of General Massena, and to have formed a junction with him.

If all these advantages are not realised ; if peace, which they would have accelerated, is removed still further from us ; upon whom must the blame and ignominy fall ? On an Army,

as weak in number, as strong in courage, whose every step has been marked by so many great exploits, in spite of the privations of every kind which they experienced? Must it fall on a Commander in Chief, who has given many proofs of his republican zeal; and who, on this occasion, and with such a disproportionate force, has displayed some military talents, and done infinitely more than there was any right to expect from him? No, doubtless;—the opprobrium can fall only on those who commanded him to begin a campaign, without having provided the means of securing to him a complete and decisive triumph.

After having exerted every effort, though in vain, to second the operations of General Massena, there remained for me no other part to take, than that of keeping myself on the defensive, till the arrival of the Army of Observation. I therefore drew back my Army to the passes of the Black Mountains. This movement began on the 7th, and the enemy followed us with a very tardy step. Then it



was that I wrote to the executive Directory, to demand its permission that I might return to Paris, in order to submit to them the real situation of the forces under my command.

On the 11th Germinal, (31 March,) I established my Army in the following manner. General Ferino, commanding the first division, received orders to retreat to Neustadt, and to dispose of his division in such a manner, as to prevent the enemy from entering the valley of that name. The second division, as well as that of the advanced guard, received orders to encamp on the heights of Brentzeben: the second division was charged to defend Friberg and the other posts, which might secure the right of the camp. That of the advanced guard was ordered to defend Scheramberg with the view to support the left of the camp, and to occupy a wood which was in its front near Crumschiltach. General Vendamme received orders to defend the passes which lead to Schiltach; and General Saint Cyr was enjoined to proceed to Frendenstadt and Kenubis to defend those two important points. As it was

impossible for me to make use of the division of cavalry, or to find them forage in these mountains, I made them retreat to Offenbourg. I fixed my quarters at Hornberg, and ordered the Generals to form abbatis upon every point by which the enemy could approach them; as well as to make every other disposition calculated to prevent surprize.

The enemy several times advanced its reconnoitring parties to different points of our position; and one of them approaching on the 13th Germinal, (2d April,) to Schiltach and Scheramberg, I was induced to suspect that we might be attacked on the 14th. I did not delay therefore, to write to all the Generals to keep them on their guard. In the night I was seized with a nephritic complaint, to which I am subject, and which has frequently obliged me to submit to a temporary secession from the command of the Army; nevertheless, I waited for the reports of the 14th. As they announced to me that every thing was in a state of tranquillity, I quitted my head quarters at Hornberg, to depart for

Straßbourg, and left the command of the Army to General Ernouf. On my road I met the courier, who brought me the authority of the Directory to go to Paris, and to confer a provisional command of the Army on General Massena. That General arriving at Straßbourg the 20th Germinal, (9th April,) and my health being somewhat established, I in a few days quitted that city. On my arrival at Paris I learned that the Executive Directory had actually displaced me, and appointed General Massena my successor.

In the mean time General Ernouf was under the necessity of drawing off his Army on the 15th to Kehl and Neubrisnach. To appreciate the motives of this retreat it will be sufficient to read the report that he made me at that period, and which I transmitted to the Directory. I transcribe it literally.



" *Head quarters of Gengenbach, 15th Germinal,*

" *(4th April,) 7th year of the French Republic,*

" *one and indivisible,*

" *General Ernouf, &c. to the Commander in Chief.*

" The Adjutant-General Molitor will undoubtedly have given you, my dear Comrade, an account of the event which has compelled me to abandon the position of Brentzen. I shall just give you a sketch of it, till I have leisure to enter into a more particular detail.

" Yesterday, 14th Germinal, (3d April,) at three in the afternoon, I received an account that the Croats and Pandours appeared to obstruct the road from Friberg to Hornberg. As it frequently happens, in a mountainous country, that a party can slip in between the posts, particularly when the peasants are in league with the enemy, this circumstance did not surprize me. The escort of the head-quarters consisted of sixty men; and I immedi-

"ately detached twenty-four of them with twelve  
 "guides.

"The Croats were repulsed, and dispersed  
 "themselves in the woods : but on arriving  
 "at half a league from Friberg, they found a  
 "hundred men of the brigade of Perrin, who  
 "could not fight from a want of cartridges : our  
 "grenadiers were obliged also to draw off from  
 "a similar dearth of ammunition. I immediately  
 "ordered a company of sapmen to advance,  
 "who happened by chance to be passing by the  
 "head-quarters, and sent a caisson with car-  
 "tridges after them. At this time Adjutant-  
 "General Hastrel entered, and told me, that  
 "the commanding officer of the brigade de  
 "Perrin had assured him, that the enemy was  
 "master of Friberg, and that all communi-  
 "cation was interrupted by that place. It  
 "was about half after five in the evening, and  
 "I was going to give orders to General Decaen,  
 "when the arrival of that officer was announced  
 "to me. He brought with him five companies  
 "of infantry. As he entered he exclaimed, "We  
 "are prettily turned." I demanded between

“ which of the posts the enemy had been able to  
 “ find a passage. He replied that he knew  
 “ nothing of it, and that they must have come  
 “ in a balloon: that they had entered Friberg  
 “ with a considerable force, about eleven in the  
 “ morning, and driven out the troops which  
 “ occupied it. That the force of the enemy  
 “ was concentrated in that place, and that they  
 “ were advancing some strong columns to Uzac  
 “ and Furtwangen. In short, he was the more  
 “ alarmed for those two posts, as he could not  
 “ communicate with them. I replied, General,  
 “ you must either perish or retake Friberg; you  
 “ were extremely to blame in not having in-  
 “ formed me the instant that the enemy had got  
 “ possession of the place. But nothing is yet  
 “ lost, you will march with your five companies  
 “ by the route of Hornberg to Friberg. I shall  
 “ send an order by Haslach, to Citizens Becker,  
 “ Merlin, and Pajol, to attack on the right,  
 “ while the right of the camp shall attack on  
 “ the left. The break of day will be the moment  
 “ of attack. General Decaen answered that my  
 “ design was impracticable; that the enemy  
 “ would attack Brentzeben in front in that



“ place, which might be done, as the troops  
 “ upon whom we depended were already carried  
 “ off. At length, pressing him home, and insisting  
 “ that the right of the camp should be re-establish-  
 “ ed, he informed me that he could not depend  
 “ upon the troops ; I resolved therefore to give  
 “ orders to quit the position. I received at the  
 “ same moment a letter from General Soult,  
 “ who acquainted me, that he had but one bat-  
 “ talion in camp, having been obliged to march  
 “ a force on the side of General Vendamme,  
 “ whom the enemy seriously menaced ; and had  
 “ entrusted the care of the camp to General  
 “ Souham.

“ I ordered General Decaen to proceed in-  
 “ stantly by the route of Hornberg, as near as  
 “ possible to Friberg, and to maintain himself  
 “ there to the last extremity.

“ I, at the same time, sent off officers to  
 “ Generals Ferino and Saint Cyr, to inform  
 “ them of my situation, and to order them to  
 “ make their retreat, the one to Freybourg and

" and Newbrifach ; and the other to Oberkirch  
 " and Kehl. General Ferino was charged to  
 " keep a strong guard at the tête du pont of  
 " Brifach ; and to detach a part of his division  
 " with all possible expedition to occupy that of  
 " Huninguen.

" General Soult has received orders to begin  
 " his retreat at one this morning, and to send  
 " his orders to the troops of the second division,  
 " that remained in camp. General Decaen was  
 " also to give notice to the same troops, as  
 " well as those of whose station General Soult  
 " might not be informed, to follow the move-  
 " ment of the advanced guard. General Soult  
 " will effect his retreat by Hornberg : General  
 " Decaen will guard the pass of Friberg to  
 " Hornberg, and will form the rear-guard of  
 " the two divisions, which are commanded by  
 " General Soult.

" I have written to General Vendamme to  
 " concert with General Soult respecting the  
 " execution of his movement. He will retreat to

“ Wolfach and Hausach, and not pass the Kint-  
 “ zig till the advanced guard and the second  
 “ division shall have filed off by Hausach.

“ I proceeded to Haslach; and during the  
 “ night I received a letter from the Adjutant  
 “ General Becker who informed me that he had  
 “ retreated to Brechthal with two companies of  
 “ infantry, a demi-squadron, and two pieces of  
 “ artillery; and that Citizen Pajol had made  
 “ his retreat to Waldkirch, where he would  
 “ make a vigorous resistance. I instantly rein-  
 “ forced Adjutant General Becker with two  
 “ companies of grenadiers and a company of  
 “ the hundred and fourth demi-brigade, which  
 “ I had brought to Haslach, to defend the route  
 “ to Elzach: I ordered two pieces of cannon to  
 “ be placed at the entry of the passes of Elzach  
 “ and of Mulbach, to Haslach; and I wrote, at  
 “ the same time to General Vendamme, whom  
 “ I ordered to take the command of all the  
 “ the troops between Haslach and Elzach. I re-  
 “ commended him to take every possible  
 “ means, to keep the enemy in check on that



" point, and, if it was in his power, to send  
 " some reinforcements to Waldkirch which  
 " Adjutant General Becker had informed me  
 " was menaced by the enemy. These measures  
 " being taken; and being also assured of the  
 " means that General Vendamme would  
 " employ; I went to reconnoitre, behind  
 " Haslach, a position which General Soult will  
 " this day occupy with the troops of the advan-  
 " ced, and those of the second, division. Those  
 " who are commanded by General Vendamme  
 " will remain at his disposition, and proceed to  
 " Haslach to be in readiness to defend the pass  
 " of Elzach. General Vendamme has orders  
 " to make his retreat to Lohr, by the valley of  
 " Schutter, in order to be more conveniently  
 " situated to march to Freybourg, if it should  
 " be necessary to protect the retreat of Ge-  
 " neral Ferino, as well as to flank our left.

" To-morrow the Army will take post be-  
 " tween Gengenbach and Offembourg. I parti-  
 " cularly recommend to General Saint Cyr to  
 " maintain the point of Oberkirch; in order

“ that the general movement of the Army may  
 “ be more regular. General Saint Cyr has in-  
 “ formed me that he is particularly harassed by  
 “ the Hussars of Zekler. I now acquaint him  
 “ that I have ordered General Klaine, who is at  
 “ Renchen, to collect his cavalry, and to make  
 “ his dispositions to protect the retreat of the  
 “ third division.

“ General Lamartiliere has taken measures  
 “ for the defence of Kehl and of all the works  
 “ which depend on it.

“ The Commissary in Chief has received strict  
 “ orders to provide subsistence for the troops,  
 “ and I am satisfied with him on that point.  
 “ Bread is arrived for the divisions, and their  
 “ subsistence is secured.

“ Now, my dear comrade, that you are ac-  
 “ quainted with my situation, and the measures  
 “ which I have taken to secure a retreat, I beg  
 “ of you to let me know if it is your intention  
 “ that I shall keep the Army in the plain of

“ Offembourg, or that it should pass the left  
 “ bank. I wait with impatience your orders  
 “ on this subject.

“ Health and Friendship,  
 “ ERNOUF.”

---

“ 16th Germinal (5th April).

“ As you inform me of your intention to  
 “ transmit a copy of my letter to the Executive  
 “ Directory, I am apprehensive that I have not  
 “ sufficiently detailed the reasons which deter-  
 “ mined me to command the retreat; and I  
 “ beg of you to add,—that being informed of  
 “ the point of Fribourg being forced, and all  
 “ our communications intercepted with those of  
 “ Elzach and Waldkirch, by which the ene-  
 “ my might arrive in force at Haslach and Frey-  
 “ bourg, and consequently possess themselves  
 “ of the point of retreat; I considered these  
 “ circumstances as of the utmost importance; and,  
 “ not to compromise the fate of the whole army,  
 “ I was determined to command a retreat, which



“ is executing with all the order and regularity  
 “ that I could wish \*.”

---

\* Brigadier-General Decaen has printed a justificatory Memoir, in which he supposes that I have denounced him to the Directory: he also reproaches me with having committed great faults during the campaign, and expresses his surprise that I quitted the army the 14th Germinal. It also very violently attacks General Ernouf, who has published an answer to whatever concerns him. As for myself, I could content myself with saying to General Decaen, that, admitting his supposition, his reproaches, and his surprise to be well founded, such a circumstance would not nullify the report of General Ernouf.—Nevertheless, I shall add, that I have not denounced him, &c. ; but knowing that he had no confidence in my talents, I requested the Directory to remove him to another army, where he might be commanded by an officer of whom he entertained a better opinion; that I transmitted to it a copy of the Report of General Ernouf; and that if I had not the talents to command which he might wish, it is not my fault: but whenever I shall be ordered to serve under the command of others, I will most certainly obey them with regularity and zeal, and will never take upon me to criticise their orders,—especially in the presence of subordinate persons. In short, if he is anxious to know the motives which have forced me to quit the army the 14th Germinal, I must beg that he will address himself to Citizen Percy, Chief Officer of Health to the Army; who is better qualified to give a detail of them than myself.

Before I conclude these Memoirs, it will be but just to recollect, that, during the whole of the campaign, our whole loss did not amount to more than five thousand, killed, wounded, and prisoners; of which number three thousand five hundred wounded were re-conducted to the left bank of the Rhine, while we brought into France five thousand Austrian prisoners, without reckoning two thousand that escaped from the inadequacy of their escort; nor has the enemy ever refused to acknowledge, that they sustained a loss, in killed and wounded, of eight thousand men. It must also be observed, that, in the whole course of the campaign, we lost but two pieces of artillery, which were abandoned from a defect in their carriages, while we took two by main force from the enemy. From these facts, which I aver to be correctly true, let the impartial reader judge, if the Army of the Danube has been beat and routed, as vile calumniators, and implacable enemies to the glory of the republican arms, have been so eager to propagate.

But if I can, by a simple detail of facts, which thirty thousand undeniable witnesses will attest with me, so easily dissipate the crowd of lies and absurd calumnies which have been uttered respecting my supposed defeat; with what an aspect is the Directory to be regarded, who, in some sort, accredited them by its strange silence, when it could have ground them to dust by the publication of my reports. This entire silence, which was kept with such a marked perverseness, could have no other motive than to deprive me of the public confidence.—This appears but too probable: but, even on this supposition, the Directory could not be so blinded by passion, as not to see that they would thus over-reach themselves, and produce incalculable evils. They ought to have known that these fables, propagated with so much passion and bitterness, had an evident tendency to cool the zeal of the conscripts, and to paralyze the recruiting of the armies.—It will doubtless appear very extraordinary to a candid observer, to see the Directory employ such extraordinary care to conceal, in other circumstances, the checks



and reverses that our armies have really sustained; while it suffered, with the utmost complacency, the publication of imaginary defeats, when they involved that army, to the command of which I had been appointed.

As there are military men who entertain an opinion, that I should have done better, to effect my retreat by Switzerland, in order to form a junction with General Massena, than to draw off to the Black Mountains, I shall explain the motives which determined me to act as I did.

The Minister of War was continually writing to me, that the Army of Observation would be collected by the 10th Germinal, (30th March), on the right bank of the Rhine; and though I was positively assured by General Bernadotte, that this army would not be ready before the end of the month; and, when the garrison battalions, which are not in a condition for campaign service, should be deducted, that it would not exceed eighteen or twenty thousand fighting men, nevertheless, this addition would, in my

opinion, have been sufficient to have enabled me to act on the offensive with Prince Charles; and in retiring to the Black Mountains, which I hoped to keep till that period, I was much better situated than in Switzerland, to be joined by that body of troops. On the other hand, I was certain that the Archduke would not turn towards Switzerland, while I occupied the passes of the Black Mountains, from whence, in that case, I could have fallen on his flank and rear. Besides, it never was my opinion that the best way of making war with Austria would be to carry our principal force into Switzerland. It may indeed, be proper to observe, that, without mentioning the great inconvenience of subsisting a numerous army in Helvetia, it is in itself such a difficult country, that a small army may hold out for a long time against a much stronger one; and that, if two armies of equal force carry on war there, they must necessarily conclude by destroying each other, from a succession of petty engagements. In other countries, one or two battles generally decides the fate of them; whereas, in Switzerland, a battle can give no

other advantage than that of gaining a more advanced position; so that there must be another battle to drive the beaten army from its new position: thus continuing to fight from position to position, which occasions a great loss of people to obtain a moderate advantage. On the contrary, by a grand movement in Suabia, I should have forced Prince Charles to weaken himself in Switzerland in order to meet me, or I should have come upon his rear. It is true, that the Army of the Danube, having been obliged to retreat to the Rhine, it was necessary to march a force into Helvetia, which General Massena did as soon as he took the command.

It is my duty to make my acknowledgments to the zeal, the talents, and the courage of all the General Officers who have served under my orders, as well as to all the Officers of my Staff, of which General Ernouf was the chief, and I acquit myself of this honourable task with equal ardour and satisfaction. It is most certain, if I had not been seconded by the energy of these intrepid warriors, it would have been impossible



for me to have produced the effects I did, with the feeble means I possessed. It becomes me equally to acknowledge, that it is to the heroic courage of the troops, to their patience in supporting the most painful privations, and, in short, to their exemplary discipline, that I am indebted for the astonishing advantage, of having so powerfully supported myself against such a superior enemy. I have another important obligation to discharge: it is to offer a well-earned tribute of praise to the Commissary-General Vailant, whose care and indefatigable activity subsisted the army in a manner far superior to what I could expect from the penury of his means. I shall close this merited panegyric, by giving, in the name of my brethren in arms, every possible acknowledgment to the Officers of Health; and particularly to their directors, who, abandoned to themselves by the Administration of the Hospitals, found in their own philanthropic virtues the means of affording the most efficacious succour to our wounded; and who left none in the power of the enemy, but those whom it was physically impossible to remove.

I presume, with some degree of confidence, that an impartial perusal of these memoirs, will impress the mind of every Frenchman with the most perfect conviction, that I did not suffer a defeat in the year 7.—With respect to that, which superficial minds, or those who feel an interest in villifying the Armies of the Republic, reproach me with having sustained in the year 4; the general memoir of my campaigns, in which I am at this moment employed, will incontestably prove the falsehood and malignity of that accusation. It will, I doubt not, cause considerable astonishment, when the nation is informed, that this General, who is so strongly charged with having sacrificed the best part of his troops, was continually sending succours to the Armies of the North, of the Ocean, of the Rhine, and of Italy; and that the Army of the Sambre and the Meuse, which he commanded, was the general depot, that furnished reinforcements to all the others.—It will be clearly seen that no General has been, at any time, more avaritious of the blood of his comrades than myself; and that whenever I could chuse between a manœuvre and a combat,

to obtain the object I proposed, I have never hesitated to employ the former.

Since I am the object of such an exasperated prejudice ; let it be permitted me, in this place, while the memoirs of all my campaigns are preparing for publication, to call to the public recollection, that, in 1793, I commanded at the battle of Houdscoote, under General Houchard ; and that at the moment when it was thought to be lost, I solicited the representative of the people, Delbrel, to authorise me to march against the enemy, which General Houchard had refused me ; and that, having obtained it, I rushed forwards at the head of three battalions of reserve, into the enemy's intrenchments, carried them by main force, and by this daring manœuvre, in which I was wounded by a discharge of grape-shot, decided that memorable battle.

That, in the same year, with an Army of forty-six thousand men, I forced Prince Cobourg to raise the siege of Maubeuge, around which



he had assembled ninety-six thousand men; that the following campaign, after having beat Beaulieu at Arlon, I traversed the Ardennes with an army of forty thousand men, and, after having met and overcome a thousand obstacles, completed my junction on the Sambre with the Army of the North. That the army of which I then took the command, under the denomination of the Army of the Sambre and the Meuse, gained, in that single campaign, the three great battles of Fleurus, of the Ourth, and the Roer; that, in this same campaign, it took Landrecies, Quesnoi, Valenciennes, and Condé;—that it also made the conquest of Charleroi and Maestricht; and that it at length fixed its winter quarters on the Rhine, after having driven the enemy to the other side of that river: That, in the year 3, it passed the Rhine in the face of the enemy, took possession of Dusseldorf, and marched on to the Maine. At this period I made certain propositions to Pichegru, all of which tended to unite the forces of the Army of the Rhine with those of the Sambre and the Meuse, in order to push forward into Germany. If I was afterwards

obliged to fall back on the Rhine, such a retrograde movement must be attributed to that General, who refused to adopt any of my propositions, and to the Committee of Public Safety, who were too dilatory in removing the difficulties that the Treaty of Basle presented, by which the Republic had consented to a line of demarcation that the Austrians did not respect. It will appear also, that this Army marched afterwards to assist that of the Rhine, and stopped the successful career of the enemy on the upper part of that river, by forcing a part of it to fall back on Mentz; and that, after several obstinate engagements, General Clairfait proposed a truce, which I accepted the more willingly, as the lines of Mentz being forced, I should have been under the necessity of making a winter campaign, which would probably have proved the destruction of the Army, or of repassing the Meuse to get into winter quarters. In the year 4, it will also be seen that this Army, by a manœuvre which is not altogether destitute of merit, compelled Prince Charles, who was encamped with a principal part of his force at Bou-

molder, and who threatened to bear down on Treves, to make a precipitate retreat to the left bank of the Rhine, by Mentz. This Army will appear also, by its movements on the Lower Rhine, to have facilitated the passage of this river for the Army which bore its name; and to have made a rapid march to within six leagues of Ratisbon:—the causes which brought on its retreat will then be unfolded; and it will be known, that, after having fought several times with heroic courage against far superior forces, it retreated in good order, with all its artillery; and not in disorder and confusion, as my personal enemies would have it believed. Lastly, it will be known, that the principal cause of this retreat, originated in the defective plan of the campaign which I was ordered to follow;—and that, when I resigned the command of this Army to General Beurnonville, he found it without magazines, shoes, or means of transport, as it had actually been from the commencement of hostilities; but, at the same time, numerous, well armed, full of courage, and ready to renew its active service, with the very small supply that



was afforded it, in transports, subsistence, and cloathing. I would invoke, if it were necessary, the testimony of the Generals Lefebvre, Championnet, Bernadotte, Collaud, Grenier, and, among many others, that of General Beurnonville, who, perhaps, had been at first imposed upon by false reports; but who acknowledged the truth of what I now advance, when he reviewed the Army on succeeding to its command.

I well know that there is a class of men who love me not, and whose aim is, by any and every means, to ruin me in the public opinion. They will not fail to exhaust their treachery and cunning in framing comments on these Memoirs. But I shall not trouble myself concerning their judgments, so that those who know me better continue to regard me; and that the brave men, whom I have had the honour to command, are satisfied that I have rendered them all the justice which they have so generally merited.

To serve his country with zeal, courage, loyalty, and disinterested affection, are the duties imperiously imposed on all republicans.— I leave the impartial public to determine who has fulfilled them with the greatest fidelity, my calumniators or myself.

(Signed)

JOURDAN.

---

P. S. I am informed that certain persons, on hearing that I was engaged in these Memoirs, have declared their intention to answer them. A design so prematurely formed, announces somewhat more of passion than of justice. But, be that as it may, if it is clearly proved to me that I have committed faults, I will meditate in silence on the instructions I shall receive, and store them up for future occasions. If it shall be made to appear, that there are errors in my narrative, I shall hasten to repair them; but if I am calumniated, I shall return no answer.

I could draw new proofs, if that were necessary, of every thing I have said respecting the superiority of the Imperial Army, and the operations of the respective Armies in Suabia, from a journal which is printed at Hamburgh, intituled, *Precis des Evénemens Militaires* \*. This journal, which I received at the moment when I was finishing these Memoirs, has additional merit from the sensible conduct of its authors, who, disdaining the ordinary and incorrect haste of daily journals, have suspended their publication to a more distant period, when their judgment must possess better means to determine between truth and error. The account of the operations of war appear to be digested from official reports. The general motions of the Armies are related with the greatest exactness: but the particular motions are not described with equal accuracy, which is not surprizing; nor, indeed, is it necessary to the design of the Authors.

---

\* Published by Perthes, bookseller at Hamburgh; and Debrett, Piccadilly, London.



The following Table of the respective forces,  
appears in Number I. of this Journal:

#### FRENCH ARMIES.

##### Army of Observation and Garrisons

from Duffeldorf to Manheim, - 25,000

Army of the Danube, - - - - 42,000

Army of Switzerland, - - - - 45,000

#### IMPERIAL ARMIES.

##### Army of Observation and Garrison

of Wurzburg, - - - - 24,000

Grand Army in Suabia, - - - - 66,000

In the Woralberg, - - - - 18,000

In the Grisons, - - - - 7,000

In the Tyrol, - - - - 18,000

It appears that the writers who compile this Journal have had an exact knowledge of the force appointed to act under my orders. In fact, if the troops announced by the Minister of War to form the Army of Observation had arrived ;— if the levies of the Army of the Danube had

been complete ;—if the Swiss demi-brigades had been formed,—I should have actually had under my command the number of troops which they have stated.—But it has been made to appear, that it was reduced to sixty-six thousand men, divided into two Armies of the Danube and Helvetia, while the Imperial forces, which were brought to oppose them amounted, according to the preceding table, to an hundred and thirty-three thousand men.—This Journal also proves, that I have done every thing which man could do, by my co-operations, to render the plan of the campaign successful. I request those who are preparing to display my errors, to give it a perusal, before they venture to compose a commentary on my Memoirs ; or I shall possess all the advantage of opposing their opinion by the testimony of men who, writing at Hamburgh, can have no motive to make a sacrifice of Truth, to serve me.

THE END.

been complete;—it is the only one which has  
 been formed.—I should have actually had under  
 my command the number of troops which they  
 have raised.—but it is not made to appear  
 that it was reduced to fifty-six thousand men,  
 divided into two armies of the Danube and  
 Histeria, while the Imperial forces which were  
 brought to oppose them amounted, according  
 to the preceding table, to an hundred and thirty-  
 three thousand men.—This point also proves  
 that I have not done what I could  
 do, by my own plan of the campaign.  
 The campaign of 1821, I repeat, those who  
 are preparing to display my errors to give it a  
 perusal before they venture to compose a com-  
 munity on my Memoirs; or I shall regret all  
 the advantage of opposing their opinion by the  
 testimony of men who, writing at Hamburgh,  
 can have no motive to make a latitude of  
 truth to serve me.  
 THE END  
 Printed by Decker and Co., St. James's Street, London.

